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The response of aggregate labor supply to various changes in the economic environment is central
to many economic issues, especially the optimal design of tax policies.  This paper surveys recent
work that uses structural models and micro data to evaluate the size of this response. Whereas the
earlier literature on this issue often concluded that aggregate labor supply elasticities were small, recent
work has identified three key reasons that the aggregate elasticity may be quite large.  First, earlier
estimates abstracted from several key features, including human capital accumulation, leading to estimates
that are dramatically negatively biased. Second, failure to understand that aggregate labor supply adjustments
can occur along both the hours per worker and employment margins has led economists to misinterpret
the implications of previous estimates for aggregate labor supply. Third, structural estimation of responses
along the extensive (i.e., employment) margin are typically quite large.
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This survey deals with an issue that is extremely important for a wide range
of applied issues—the magnitude of aggregate labor supply responses to various
changes in the economic environment. In addition to being a very important
issue, it is also well known to be quite controversial. In particular, there is a
long-standing controversy driven by the fact that on the one hand, researchers
who look at micro data typically estimate relatively small labor supply elasticities,
while on the other hand, researchers who use representative agent models to study
aggregate outcomes typically employ parameterizations that imply relatively large
aggregate labor supply elasticities.
The objective of this survey will be to clarify the issues related to this apparent
controversy. A key point that we wish to stress from the outset is that in general
labor supply elasticities are neither a single number nor a primitive feature of
preferences. We believe that one important source of confusion in the literature
is the idea that one can estimate a labor supply elasticity in one context and
import this elasticity into other contexts. While this may be warranted in some
contexts under speciﬁc assumptions, in general this is problematic. At a broad
level, one can ask what happens to diﬀerent dimensions of labor supply (individual
or aggregate) in response to some change in the economic environment. This
response will typically depend on the features of preferences, technology, market
structure, and of course on the nature of the change to the economic environment.
For example, in the context of taxes, one must specify if the tax changes are
temporary or permanent, anticipated or unanticipated, and what the tax revenues
1are used for. Moreover, whereas in a static setting one might represent labor
supply by a single number (say hours worked), in a dynamic setting, labor supply
is necessarily a higher dimensional object, specifying hours worked at each age. In
general there is no single number that can describe the change in labor supply to
a wide class of changes in the economic environment. The change today may be
diﬀerent than the change in future periods. We might be interested in the current
change or the change over the entire future.
A key message from this discussion is that it is important for economists to
adopt a framework in which the choice problem of an individual is explicitly for-
mulated, and where the parameters that characterize this choice problem are the
key parameters that determine the response of various components of labor supply
in response to diﬀerent changes. This message is similar in spirit to that of the
Handbook of Macroeconomics chapter by Browning, Hansen and Heckman (1999).
Economists should be seeking to identify the underlying structural parameters of
these choice problems and then use that information to infer elasticities, rather
than trying to explicitly estimate something called a labor supply elasticity that
is then applied across diﬀerent situations.
Having set this as the framework for our analysis, we explore two key issues
of interest. First, what is the mapping from a given set of observations to the
underlying preference parameters of interest? Second, what is the relationship
between parameters that describe the response of a given individual at a particular
point in time to the response at the aggregate level? Our main conclusion here
is that recent work forces us to rethink some aspects of labor supply and labor
2supply elasticities that many have taken for granted for some time.
In the next section we provide some background material that serves to high-
light the apparent controversy regarding labor supply elasticities estimated from
micro data and the aggregate elasticities implicit in many aggregate models.
Speciﬁcally, we lay out a benchmark model that represents a standard frame-
work used by many economists to think about these issues. An important feature
of this benchmark model is that it provides a clear empirical strategy for using
micro data to uncover the values of key preference parameters. It also provides a
clear mapping from these preference parameters to the eﬀect of various changes
in the economic environment on aggregate labor supply. We use this benchmark
model as a vehicle to present the controversy between micro and macro labor
supply elasticities.
Because it will be easier to describe the speciﬁc contributions of this survey
once this benchmark model has been laid out, we postpone a more complete
outline of the survey until the next section. Put very brieﬂy, having laid out the
benchmark model, we describe several extensions that have been pursued over
the last decade or so and argue that the controversy seems much less apparent
(if not non-existent) when one uses these extended models to view the data. Our
conclusion is that much of the controversy is due to the fact that economists
generally continue to view the world through the lens of this benchmark model,
which abstracts from these empirically important features.
32. Background and Overview
In this section we present a framework that serves to highlight the apparent tension
between evidence from micro studies and common practice in modelling aggregate
phenomena. Having presented this model we then use it as a vehicle to describe
the nature of the controversy, and provide an outline for the remainder of this
survey.
2.1. A Benchmark Model
In this section we present a benchmark model that connects elasticity estimates
from panel data with those from aggregate data and serves to highlight the appar-




















where  denotes age and  and  are consumption and hours worked at age 
respectively. There are four key preference parameters: , , ,a n d.I nw h a t
follows we will strive to use these parameters consistently throughout the survey.1
The individual is endowed with one unit of time during each period of life, and
faces an exogenous sequence of productivity over his life cycle. Speciﬁcally, an
1Readers familiar with the literature will know that there is some variation in the literature
regarding the parameterizion of this class of utility functions, with some researchers preferring
to write the exponents on consumption and hours worked as 1 −  and 1+. W en o t eh e r e
that the reader should be careful in moving between results as reported here and in the original
contributions that we survey since creating uniform notation in this survey necessarily means
that what we refer to as  in our survey may actually show up as 1 in one of the original
contributions.
4individual of age  has productivity , so that if he supplies  units of time
at age  it results in  units of labor services. The production side of the
economy is the standard one associated with the neoclassical growth model: there
is a constant returns to scale aggregate production function ( ),w h e r e








where  and  are the steady state life cycle proﬁles for hours worked and capital
holdings. Output can be used as either consumption or investment and capital
depreciates at rate . We consider a tax and transfer system with the following
properties: labor earnings are taxed at the constant rate  and the resulting
revenues are used to fund a lump-sum transfer. In order to abstract from issues of
intergenerational redistribution, we assume that the lump-sum transfer received
by any generation is equal in present value to the tax revenues that they pay.2
If we considered this type of labor tax and transfer system in an inﬁnitely
lived agent model, the steady state interest rate would be unaﬀected and would
exactly oﬀset the discount factor that is part of the preference speciﬁcation, i.e.,
we would have 1
1+− = ,w h e r e is the rental rate on capital. Neither of
these properties necessarily hold in an overlapping generations economy. Since
our primary interest is in the eﬀects of taxes controlling for changes in any other
2This simple tax and transfer system has little connection with the features of actual tax
and transfer systems that we observe in reality. While analysis of it is perhaps of limited direct
interest in terms of policy analysis, it is very useful as a vehicle to exposit the central issues that
we address. The reason for this is that the eﬀe c t so ft h i st y p eo fp o l i c yc o r r e s p o n dt ot h eH i c k s
elasticity and hence provide a clean connection to the literature on elasticities.
5factors, such as interest rates, in order to make the analysis more transparent
we will assume that the steady state interest rate is not aﬀected by the labor
tax rate and transfer program and is equal to the same value as in the steady
state of the inﬁnitely lived agent economy, i.e., that the rental rate on capital
net of depreciation must exactly oﬀset the individual’s discounting. We note that
there is always a government debt policy that would support this interest rate
as a steady state equilibrium. If the steady state interest rate is independent of
the tax rate, the fact that  satisﬁes constant returns to scale implies that the
wage per unit of labor services will also be independent of the tax rate. Denote
this value by . The above comments imply that in steady state, a newly born






























Letting  denote the Lagrange multiplier on the budget equation, we have the








 =( 1− ) (2.2)
Equation (2.1) implies that  will be constant over the life cycle.4 Taking logs
3We assume that the individual is born with zero capital, so capital holdings over time do
not appear in the present value budget equation.
4The constancy of consumption over the life cycle is not consistent with micro data. There
6of equation (2.2) gives a simple version of the equation used by MaCurdy (1981)
and others in their estimation exercises using micro data:
log =  +  log (2.3)
where  = [log +l o g +l o g ( 1− ) − log] is a constant from the perspective
of following an individual over their life cycle in steady state. Recall that changes
in log are equivalent to changes in log wages for individuals over the life cycle.
It follows that this equation provides a strategy for uncovering the preference
parameter  using individual panel data. As we describe in more detail below,
one can also use this information to uncover the value of .
Next we illustrate via one simple example how the values of these prefer-
ence parameters estimated from micro data allow one to infer the consequences
of changes in the aggregate economic environment on aggregate hours of work.
Speciﬁcally, we consider the eﬀects of a change in the scale of the tax and transfer
program, i.e., a change in .
Equation (2.3) is a useful starting point, but note that it is not suﬃcient to
determine the response in  to a change in the scale of the tax and transfer
system. The reason for this is that if we are comparing  across the two steady
state equilibria that correspond to diﬀerent values of  then it is also the case that
the value of  will diﬀer across the two steady states. Hence, in order to solve for
t h ec h a n g ei n we need to also derive an expression for the change in .
are various ways to avoid this implication, for example by allowing for age eﬀects on the marginal
utility of consumption. Because our focus here is on the implications for labor supply we abstract
from these possibilities.
7T os o l v ef o rt h ec h a n g ei n we proceed in several steps. First, note from







Total labor income is therefore proportional to 0. Given that the present value
of the transfer received by each individual is equal to the present value of their









Recalling that  is constant over the life cycle, it follows that the optimal choice





[log0 +l o g +l o g¯ ] (2.5)







+l o g +l o g +l o g¯ ] (2.6)
Given our assumption that the interest rate and hence  are not aﬀected by the


















For future reference it is of interest to note the diﬀerent coeﬃcients on log(1−)
and log.T h ec o e ﬃcient on log(1 − ) is always smaller than the coeﬃcient on
log, with equality holding in the limit as  goes to inﬁnity, i.e., when utility
is linear in consumption and there are no income eﬀects. The eﬀe c to fl i f ec y c l e
variation in wages represents the Frisch elasticity, whereas the coeﬃcient on taxes
in this expression represents the Hicks elasticity. A key distinction between the
two is that the Frisch elasticity holds the marginal utility of consumption constant,
w h e r e a st h eH i c k sd o e sn o t .
The implication from equation (2.8) is that a change in  leads to a parallel
shift in the hours proﬁles, i.e., hours at all ages change by the same percentage.
Since  is simply the sum of the ,i tf o l l o w st h a t :
log =  +

 + 
log(1 − ) (2.9)
where  is a constant. Macroeconomists often impose  =1in order that prefer-
ences be consistent with balanced growth, in which case the coeﬃcient on log(1−)
is purely a function of .
The result that we want to stress for this one policy exercise in the bench-
mark model is the strong connection between preference parameters estimated
from micro data and the implied aggregate elasticity for a particular tax and
9transfer policy. Moreover, note that in this benchmark model it is also the case
that observing the response in steady state hours worked by an individual at one
particular age is suﬃcient to infer the aggregate response. For future reference
we note that all of the above results go through untouched if we impose that all
individuals must retire exogenously at some given age .
2.2. Micro Evidence Based on the Benchmark Model
The empirical literature that uses micro data to estimate labor supply elasticities
is vast, so we make no attempt to summarize it here. Classic reviews of this
literature include Hausman (1985), Pencavel (1986), Killingsworth and Heckman
(1986) and Blundell and MaCurdy (1999). For more recent reviews we refer
the reader to Meghir and Phillips (2008) and Keane (2010). We feel it a fair
statement to say that, based on this literature, the majority of the economics
profession has come to the conclusion that labor supply elasticities are small;
and, in particular, that labor supply is not very responsive to tax changes. (This
statement is certainly accurate for male labor supply; there is less consensus for
female labor supply).
Rather than summarize the whole literature, we consider three of the
most inﬂuential papers: MaCurdy (1981), Browning, Deaton and Irish (1985) and
Altonji (1986). All three papers attempt to estimate the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution, or Frisch elasticity, using micro data. Details of their approaches
diﬀer, but all involve regressing hours changes on wage changes. For example,
MaCurdy (1981) uses the same basic model described above extended to allow for
10heterogeneity and uncertainty to derive the hours change equation:
∆log = ∆log(1 − ) −  log(1 + )+∆ +  + ∆ (2.10)
The parameters , ,a n d are all as above, and we allow for the tax rate ()t o
vary across time and individuals. The  are control variables for exogenous shifts
in tastes for work, the  represent unobserved taste shocks, and  represents the
surprise part of the change in the marginal utility of wealth (or of consumption)
from  − 1 to .5 The literature has focussed on three issues: First, the  will in
general be correlated with wage changes to the extent that wage changes are not
fully anticipated at  − 1. Second, tastes for work may be correlated with wages
(e.g., those with a higher taste for work may also work harder or acquire more
skills, and, conversely, a higher taste for work can lower the after-tax wage by
pushing one into a higher tax bracket). Third, the wage is presumably measured
with considerable error.
To deal with these problems, all three of these inﬂuential papers instrument
for wage changes, using variables that were presumably known at time  − 1.
For instance, MaCurdy (1981) uses polynomials in age and education, exploiting
the fact that wages are known to follow an inverted U-shape over the life cycle,
the shape of which varies with education. The three papers noted above diﬀer
somewhat in the choice of instruments, the choice of observed taste shifters and the
5MaCurdy (1981) did not allow for shocks to the marginal utility of wealth, but MaCurdy
(1983) shows how to extend the previous analysis to allow for this. In terms of implementing the
estimation procedure, the only impact is that one needs to lag the instruments, which MaCurdy
(1981) actually did, even though he had not incorporated uncertainty.
11exact choice of the functional form for the labor supply function. Nevertheless,
all three obtain very small estimates of , the Frisch elasticity (the preferred
estimates being 015, 009 and 031, respectively, for MaCurdy, Browning et al,
and Altonji). These results have been quite inﬂuential in generating a consensus
within the profession that the Frisch elasticity is small.
Given the theoretical result that the Frisch elasticity is an upper bound on the
Marshall and Hicks elasticities in the life-cycle labor supply model, the ﬁnding of
a small Frisch elasticity has also contributed to the view that the Marshall and
Hicks elasticities (which are relevant for estimating responses to permanent tax
changes) are small as well. Furthermore, MaCurdy (1981) noted that the results of
estimating (2.10) could be used to infer the response to permanent wage changes.
This is possible because estimation of (2.10) uncovers all parameters of the hours
equation in levels,
log =  log((1 − )) +  log0 −  log(1 + )
 +  +  (2.11)
except for  log0, which is the individual speciﬁc constant (or “ﬁxed eﬀect”) in
the levels equation (where 0 is the marginal utility of wealth at  =0 ). Thus,
MaCurdy (1981) backs out the value of  log0 in a second stage after estimating
(2.10) in the ﬁrst stage. Given these constants, MaCurdy can, in principle, regress
them on the whole set of life-cycle wages.6 His estimates imply that a 10% (fully
6Of course, MaCurdy only observes wages for his 10 year sample period — not the whole life-
cycle. To deal with this problem, he ﬁts a life-cycle wage proﬁle for each person using 10 years
of data. He then regresses the estimated values of  log0 on the individual speciﬁc parameters
of this (assumed quadratic) proﬁle. Using the coeﬃcient on the wage proﬁle intercept, MaCurdy
can determine how an upward shift in the whole wage proﬁle would aﬀect  log0, and hence
12anticipated) increase in wages at all ages would increase labor supply by only 08%
-av e r ys m a l le ﬀect.
As noted earlier, these sorts of results have lead to a majority view in
the profession that labor supply elasticities are quite small. This majority view
is summed up nicely in a recent survey by Saez, Slemrod and Giertz (2009), who
state: “... optimal progressivity of the tax-transfer system, as well as the optimal
size of the public sector, depend (inversely) on the ... elasticity of labor supply
.... With some exceptions, the profession has settled on a value for this elasticity
close to zero... In models with only a labor-leisure choice, this implies that the
eﬃciency cost of taxing labor income ... is bound to be low as well.”
2.3. Macroeconomic Models
While the view that labor supply elasticities are small is clearly the majority
position among microeconomists, this view is less well accepted among macro-
economists.7 Beginning with Lucas and Rapping (1969), many macroeconomists
have argued that relatively large Frisch elasticities are required in order to ac-
c o u n tf o rt h es i z eo fl a b o rm a r k e tﬂuctuations over the business cycle.8 Prescott
(2004) shows that a relatively large labor supply elasticity is also required to ra-
tionalize the low frequency changes in hours of work among G-7 economies since
labor supply.
7In his Nobel lecture, Prescott (2004) argues that relatively large labor supply elasticities are
important in reconciling various aggregate observations.
8Benhabib et al (1991) show that intratemporal substitution between home and market
production can also contribute to a large elasticity for hours of market work.
131970.9 In fact, in the inﬁnitely lived stand-in household models that remain the
norm in much of the literature on aggregate economic issues, it is standard to
adopt speciﬁcations in which the period utility function is assumed to be log lin-
ear in consumption and leisure. Assuming that time spent in non-market work
(leisure) is roughly twice as large as time spent in market work, this speciﬁcation
corresponds to assuming a Frisch elasticity of around 20.
The main point that we want the reader to take away from this brief overview
is that viewed from the perspective of the simple benchmark model described
earlier, there appears to be a strong tension between evidence based on micro
studies and speciﬁcations commonly adopted in aggregate studies.
2.4. Overview of the Survey
The purpose of the present survey is to shed light on the reasons for the discrep-
ancy between micro and macro views of labor supply. We will concede up front
that we have a clear opinion on this matter: Our position is that the view that
estimates based on micro data rule out large aggregate elasticities is ﬂawed. In
particular, our objective is to present the case that empirical evidence like that
found by MaCurdy (1981), Browning et al (1985) and Altonji (1985) — as well
as many other similar studies in the micro literature — is fully consistent with a
world where aggregate labor supply elasticities are in fact large.
There are four main approaches one could take to this problem. The ﬁrst,
which we will not pursue, is to directly take issue with the claim that the mi-
9Ohanian et al (2008) extend this ﬁnding to a larger set of countries and a longer time period.
See also Rogerson (2008) and McDaniel (2011).
14cro literature reaches a clear consensus on labor supply elasticities. For example,
Keane (2010) surveys 21 of the best known studies that estimate the Hicks elas-
ticity for males. He notes that the studies seem to bifurcate into a low group
vs. a high group, with thirteen producing estimates in a tight range from 002
to 013, while eight studies produce estimates in the 027 to 122 range. There is
an odd gap between 013 and 027, with no studies falling in that range. Hence,
he argues, even among labor economists there is a non-negligible minority who
ﬁnd relatively large elasticities using conventional methods. Keane (2010) also
discusses the reasons that much of the profession seems to discount the sizeable
minority of studies that ﬁnd large elasticities, and discusses whether these reasons
are valid. We refer the reader to his survey for further details.
Second, as with any empirical work, one could criticize the micro empirical
studies that ﬁnd small labor supply elasticities on their own terms. That is, one
could accept the basic empirical framework (as illustrated by equation (2.10))
but question the implementation. Speciﬁcally, one could question the instruments
used for wages, the controls used for tastes for work, the functional forms used for
the labor supply function, the measurement of wages, taxes, etc. For instance, as
noted earlier, it is quite common in the life-cycle labor supply literature to esti-
mate equations like (2.10) using polynomials in age and education as instruments
for wage changes. But these instruments are quite weak, leading to very large
standard errors on the estimates of the Frisch elasticity. Thus, while the point
estimates imply small elasticities, conventional conﬁdence intervals are consistent
with rather large elasticities. Again, we will not take this tack here (and we refer
15the reader to the surveys cited earlier for further details).
The third approach, which we do adopt here, involves questioning key assump-
tions of the standard micro labor supply model described earlier. We will describe
a number of potentially important omitted features of the standard model that
may have led prior studies to understate both the value of the preference parame-
ter  and the implied labor supply responses to speciﬁc changes in tax rates. For
example, Imai and Keane (2004) argue that estimates of  are severely downward
biased by the failure to account for human capital. They found that estimating
a model where wages grow with work experience yielded rather large estimates
of . Other potentially important omitted factors that we will look at are credit
constraints (Domeij and Floden (2006)), and uninsurable wage risk (Low (2005)).
The fourth approach, which we also take, involves questioning whether the
standard labor supply model described earlier is even relevant for determining
labor supply responses at the macro level. The key issues here are the extensive
margin, population heterogeneity and aggregation. For instance, as noted earlier
in the benchmark model, macro labor supply responses are determined by the
individual preference parameter . Rogerson and Wallenius (2009) show that the
close link between this individual preference parameter and aggregate labor supply
responses is broken when one accounts for labor supply choices on the extensive
margin. In particular, the aggregate responses can be much larger than would be
implied by the estimated value of  when viewed through the lens of the benchmark
model described above. And Chang and Kim (2006) show that in a population
with heterogeneous productivities and incomplete markets in which all adjustment
16occurs at the extensive margin, the labor supply response at the aggregate level
is determined by the distribution of reservation wages and is unrelated to the
underlying individual preference parameter .I ti st h u sp o s s i b l et h a tl a b o rs u p p l y
could be quite inelastic on the intensive margin at the individual level, yet quite
responsive in the aggregate.
The fourth approach just described emphasizes the role of adjustment along the
extensive margin in terms of reconciling small elasticities estimated from micro
data with large elasticities at the aggregate level. Key to this reconciliation is
that each of the three early studies noted above (MaCurdy, Browning et al and
Altonji), as well as most of the other structural analyses based on micro data,
implicitly focus on adjustment along the intensive margin. If adjustment along
the extensive margin plays such an important role, a key issue is to assess the
size of this response using micro data. We close the survey by considering the
results from micro data analyses that allow for an extensive margin, due to say
ﬁxed costs associated with market work (Cogan (1981)).
3. Micro Evidence Based on Extensions of the Basic Model
As we noted earlier, the basic life-cycle labor supply model of MaCurdy (1981)
abstracts from a number of potentially important features of the economic envi-
ronment. These include human capital, credit constraints, uninsurable wage risk,
adjustment costs and optimization errors. In this section we discuss a number of
recent papers that argue that the failure to account for these features may have
led prior micro empirical studies to underestimate the value of the preference pa-
17rameter  and hence the responsiveness of labor supply to changes in wages or
taxes. We note that all of the estimates described in this section are based on
adjustment along the intensive margin.
3.1. Human Capital Accumulation
The classic MaCurdy (1981) life-cycle model assumes that wages evolve exoge-
nously over the life-cycle. That is, it rules out the possibility that workers may
acquire human capital via on-the-job investment in skills, or through learning by
doing. Heckman (1976) considered a model with on-the-job investment in skills,
where workers are only paid for the fraction of the day they engage in produc-
tive work (i.e., not the time they spend learning). He noted that in this type
of model a worker’s measured wage rate (i.e., earnings divided by total hours at
work) would be less than his/her true productivity. His estimates implied that
for young workers productivity exceeded the wage by as much as 54%,w h i l ef o r
workers in their forties the divergence had largely vanished.
Shaw (1989) extended the MaCurdy (1981) framework to include human cap-
ital investment of the learning-by-doing variety. Analogous to Heckman (1976),
her estimates implied that the return to an hour of work substantially exceeded
the observed wage for young workers, due to the fact that a substantial part of the
return came in the form of learning that augmented future wages. Again, this di-
vergence narrowed for older workers. However, neither Heckman (1976) nor Shaw
(1989) directly considered the impact of ignoring human capital on estimates of
preference parameters and labor supply responses.
18Imai and Keane (2004) argued that ignoring human capital would lead to a
downward bias in estimates of . To illustrate the key point, assume that wages





where 0 and 1 represents a person’s initial wage (or skill endowment) upon
ﬁrst entering the labor market. Given this simple functional form, a one unit
increase in  r a i s e st h ew a g eb y1 in all future periods. This, in turn, raises
earnings by 1+ for  =1  − .10
In a model with human capital, the return to an hour of work, which we will
refer to as the opportunity cost of time (OCT), consists of the after tax wage plus
the expected present value of increased (after-tax) earnings in all future periods
obtained by working an extra hour at time . We will refer to this additional
“return to work experience” term as the “human capital term” (HC).
Of course, the optimality condition for an interior solution for hours equates
the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between consumption and leisure to the
OCT. Using the same utility function as in the benchmark model of Section 2 we
10In fact, Heckman (1976), Shaw (1989) and Imai and Keane (2004) all assume a much more
complex wage process than that given in equation (3.1). They all allow for complementarity
between human capital and hours of work in the human capital production function. In particu-
lar, the Imai-Keane speciﬁcation is designed to capture the empirical regularity that wages grow
much more quickly with work experience for high-wage workers than for low-wage workers. They
achieve this both by allowing for complementarity between human capital and hours, and by
letting the parameters of the human capital production function diﬀer by education level. The















(1 + )1+ (3.2)
A model without human capital would equate the MRS to the after tax wage
itself, ignoring the human term on the right hand side of equation (3.2).
To gain intuition for the eﬀect of ignoring the human capital term, consider
Figure 1, which presents a stylized (but fairly accurate) picture of how male wages
and hours move over the life-cycle.11 The wage rate exhibits the typical “hump
shape” over the life-cycle observed in many studies for males (i.e., wages start
out low when a person is young, grow rapidly early in the life-cycle, peak in the
40s, and then decline)12. The curve representing annual hours of work also has
a hump shape but with much less curvature (see, e.g., the descriptive regressions
presented by Pencavel (1986)).
As noted earlier, the typical study in the male labor supply literature uses
equations similar to (2.10) to estimate , the intertemporal elasticity of substitu-
tion. That is, it simply regresses hours growth on wage growth (along with controls
for changing tastes for work). To deal with endogeneity of wages, it instruments
for wages primarily using polynomials in age and education. These instruments
are chosen precisely because they capture the hump shape of the life-cycle wage
path shown in Figure 1, so predicted wages based on these instruments closely
11That is, it does not plot any particular data set, but simply illustrates the typical patterns
for male wages and hours observed across a broad range of data sets. Note that wage and hours
patterns for women are rather diﬀerent, as both wages and hours tend to ﬂatten out or drop in
the 30s, presumably due to fertility.
12The details of this pattern diﬀer by education level (i.e., wages of more educated workers
tend to peak later).
20track the typical life-cycle wage path depicted in the ﬁgure. Thus, by regressing
hours on predicted wages, one essentially uncovers the relative slope of the hours
and wage curves in Figure 1. Since the wage path is much steeper than the hours
path over most of the life-cycle, the estimated elasticity of hours with respect to
predicted wages is small (i.e., much less than 10).13
The third line in Figure 1 represents the return to human capital investment,
the second term on the right-hand-side of equation (3.2), which we denote “HC.”
The estimates in Imai and Keane (2004) imply that at age 20 this human capital
return is actually slightly larger than the wage itself, which is why in Figure
1 the HC curve is drawn as starting slightly higher than the wage curve. Of
course, the human capital investment return declines with age, both because of
diminishing returns to human capital and because the worker approaches the end
of the planning horizon T.14
Figure 1 also plots the opportunity cost of time (OCT) which equals the wage
plus the human capital return to an hour of work. It is obtained as the vertical sum
of the wage and HC curves. Because the HC term falls as the wage increases, the
OCT curve is much ﬂatter than the wage curve. This basic pattern is common to
the Heckman (1976), Shaw (1989) and Imai and Keane (2004) estimates (although
t h er e l a t i v es l o p e so ft h et w oc u r v e sd i ﬀer across the studies).
Imai and Keane (2004) estimate the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
13In other words, both wages and hours have a humped shape over the life-cycle, but the
hump in wages is much more pronounced. This apparently weak response of hours to wages
leads conventional methods (which ignore human capital) to infer a low value for the preference
parameter .
14The Imai and Keane estimates imply that by age 36 the human capital return is only 25%
as large as the wage. Thus, the HC curve is drawn as falling with age.
21using a model that takes into account the HC term in (3.2). That is, they look
at how hours respond to changes in the OCT, rather than the wage. Intuitively,
their procedure amounts to taking the ratio of the slope of the hours line to the
OCT line in Figure 1 (in contrast to the conventional procedure that amounts to
taking the ratio of the slope of the hours curve to the wage curve). As the OCT
line is much ﬂatter than the hours line, this will produce a much larger estimate
of the responsiveness of labor supply to the price of time.
They estimate their model using white males from the NLSY79. The men in
their sample are aged 20 to 36 and, as the focus of the paper is solely on labor
supply, they are required to have ﬁnished school. Imai and Keane (2004) estimate
that  =3 8. In a model without human capital, this would imply a much higher
willingness to substitute labor intertemporally than in almost all prior studies for
men (see MaCurdy (1983) for an exception).
A key point, however, is that once human capital is incorporated into the
life-cycle model, there is no longer a simple direct mapping from the preference
parameter  to the response in hours to a transitory wage change. As we discussed
in Section 2, conditional on a value of , MaCurdy (1981) could summarize the
eﬀects of permanent and transitory tax changes in his model by the single parame-
ter . In the Imai-Keane model, the situation is much more complicated. This is
illustrated in Table 1, which simulates the eﬀects of permanent and transitory tax
increases using their model.15 Note that eﬀects of transitory tax increases were
15Note that since we are assuming a constant returns to scale production function these tax
experiments have no impact on the pre-tax wage rate.
22reported in Imai and Keane (2004).16 The simulations of the eﬀects of permanent
tax changes are new.17
Table 1
Eﬀects of an Unexpected 5% Tax Increase on Hours Worked (in %)i nI m a i - K e a n e
Age Transitory Permanent
Uncompensated Compensated
20 −15 −07 −32
25 −18 −06 −27
30 −22 −06 −24
35 −26 −01 −23
40 −32 −07 −23
45 −38 −10 −28
50 −47 −23 −42
60 −86 −94 −105
T h et a b l er e p o r t st h ee ﬀects of an unexpected ﬁve percentage point increase in
the tax rate, assuming that there is no change in any transfer payments received by
the individual. In the column labelled “transitory,” the tax increase only applies
for one year at the indicated age. For example, at age 20, a temporary 5% tax
increase reduces hours by 15%. This implies a labor supply elasticity with respect
to transitory tax changes of approximately 03.T h i sﬁgure is far smaller than one
16The only diﬀerence is that Imai and Keane (2004) reported eﬀects of 2% tax increases, while
here we have used their model to simulate 5% tax increases.
17We thank Susumu Imai for providing us with these simulations.
23might expect, given the estimate of  =3 8.B u t ,a sI m a ia n dK e a n en o t e d ,t h e
eﬀect of transitory taxes increases substantially with age. For instance, at age
60,at e m p o r a r y5% tax increase reduces hours by 86%, implying an elasticity of
roughly 17.
Why does the labor supply elasticity increase with age in this model? And
why is the eﬀect of transitory tax increases so small at young ages (despite the
high value of ) ? T h er e a s o n sa r ea sf o l l o w s : A ty o u n ga g e st h ew a g ei so n l y
a relatively small part of the opportunity cost of time (i.e., a large part of the
return to work comes in the form of increased future wages).18 A temporary tax
increase alters the current after-tax wage in equation (3.2), but it has no direct
eﬀect on the human capital component of the OCT. Indeed, to the extent that a
temporary tax increase causes workers to plan to work fewer hours in the current
period and more hours in future periods, the human capital return component to
work may actually increase — as the expected present value term in (3.2) contains
hours in all future periods.
Unfortunately, Imai and Keane (2004) did not use their model to simulate
responses to permanent tax increases. These are arguably more interesting from
a public ﬁnance point of view. To ﬁll this gap, Keane (2009) uses the Imai-
Keane model to simulate the impact of an unexpected permanent 5% tax rate
increase (starting at age 20 and lasting through age 65) on labor supply over the
entire working life. If the revenue is simply thrown away, the model implies that
average hours of work (from ages 20 to 65)d r o p sf r o m1992 p e ry e a rt o1954 per
18According to Imai and Keane (2004)’s estimates, at age 20 the wage is less than half of the
opportunity cost of time, but by age 40 the wage is 84% of the opportunity cost of time.
24year, a 2% drop. If the revenue is redistributed as a lump sum transfer, labor
supply drops to 1861 hours per year, a 66% drop. The former ﬁgure implies
an uncompensated (Marshallian) elasticity of roughly 04, while the latter ﬁgure
implies a compensated (or Hicks) elasticity with respect to permanent tax changes
of roughly 13. Both these values are quite large compared to ones typically
obtained in models without human capital.19
Keane (2009) also uses the Imai-Keane estimates to calibrate a simple two-
period equilibrium version of their model. Not surprisingly, given the large value
of the Hicks elasticity that the model implies, he ﬁnds that the welfare costs of
labor income taxation are much larger than more conventional estimates would
suggest.
It is notable that the eﬀects of permanent tax changes on current labor supply
diﬀer greatly depending on a worker’s age at the time the tax is implemented.
This is shown in the last two columns of Table 1. In the table, the permanent tax
increase takes eﬀect (unexpectedly) at the indicated age and lasts until age 65.I n
the uncompensated case the revenues are thrown away, while in the compensated
case the proceeds of the tax (in each year) are distributed back to agents in lump
sum fashion. One notable ﬁnding is that compensated eﬀects are much larger
than uncompensated, implying that income eﬀects are substantial. And both
compensated and uncompensated eﬀects of tax increases are much larger at older
ages. For instance, as we see in Table 1, for workers in their 20s, 30sa n d40s, the
19When discussing transitory tax increases we assumed that the revenues were thrown away.
This has virtually no eﬀect on the results since the revenue generated from a transitory tax is
suﬃciently small that the income eﬀects are too small to make much diﬀerence for the elasticity
calculation (as any extra income is spread over the whole remaining life).
25compensated eﬀects of a 5% permanent tax increase on annual hours worked range
from −23% to −32%.B u t f o r w o r k e r s i n t h e i r 50sa n d60s these magnitudes
grow substantially.
One striking result in Table 1 is that, for younger workers, permanent tax
increases have larger eﬀects on current labor supply than do transitory tax in-
creases. For instance, consider a 5% t a xi n c r e a s et h a tt a k e sp l a c ea ta g e25.I f
it is perceived as transitory, hours are reduced by 18%. But if the tax increase
is perceived as permanent and the proceeds are distributed lump sum, hours fall
by 27%.S o a t a g e 25,t h ep e r m a n e n tt a xe ﬀect is about 50% greater. By the
mid-30s, the eﬀects of permanent and transitory tax cuts are roughly equal. Only
in the 40sd oe ﬀects of transitory tax cuts become somewhat larger.
These ﬁndings contradict a strong prediction of the standard life-cycle model
(without human capital) that transitory tax changes should have larger eﬀects on
current labor supply than permanent ones.20 They also contradict the broader
conventional wisdom in economics that temporary price changes will have larger
eﬀects on demand than permanent ones.
Why can permanent tax changes have larger short run eﬀects than transitory
tax changes once human capital is introduced? The reason for this phenomenon
was already mentioned when we discussed why the eﬀects of transitory tax changes
appear small in this model given the estimate of .S p e c i ﬁc a l l y ,a sw es e ei n
equation (3.2), a transitory tax increase only directly reduces the current after-
20This is equivalent to the statement that the Frisch elasticity should exceed the Hicks, which
should in turn exceed the Marshallian (see Blundell and MaCurdy (1999)). The exception is
when there are no income eﬀects, in which case the three are equal.
26tax wage, which is just one component of the OCT. A permanent tax increase,
on the other hand, also reduces the expected present value of future after-tax
e a r n i n g s ,s oi ta l s oa ﬀects the human capital term in the OCT.
Keane (2009) pointed out the possibility that a permanent tax change could
have a larger eﬀect on current labor supply than a temporary tax change in a life-
cycle model once human capital is introduced. Using a simple two-period version
o ft h eI m a i - K e a n em o d e l ,h ec l a r i ﬁes the condition under which this phenomenon
may occur. Speciﬁc a l l y ,t h e r ea r et w oo p p o s i n gf o r c e sa tw o r k :O nt h eo n eh a n d ,
a permanent tax increase has a larger eﬀect on the current value of time, because
it lowers the future returns to work experience (the human capital eﬀect). On
the other hand, a permanent tax increase also has a larger income eﬀect. As
Keane (2009) shows, permanent tax changes will have larger eﬀects than transitory
changes if the return to work experience (the human capital eﬀect) is large enough
relative to the income eﬀect.
So far, we have discussed how the current eﬀects of tax changes diﬀer
depending on the age of the individual at the time of the change. Next, we
examine how the eﬀect of a given tax change diﬀers as an individual ages. This
is described in Table 2.
27Table 2
Eﬀects of an Unexpected 5% Permanent Tax Increase in Imai-Keane (all changes in %)
Age 25 Age 30 Age 35
Age Hours Wage Assets Hours Wage Assets Hours Wage Assets
25 −27
30 −29 −04+ 1 9 8 −24
35 −32 −07+ 2 6 3 −27 −03+ 1 2 4 −23
40 −38 −10+ 1 4 5 −33 −06+ 8 5 −27 −02+ 3 2
45 −51 −13+ 6 9 −44 −09+ 4 3 −38 −05+ 1 9
50 −79 −20+ 2 6 −70 −14+ 1 5 −62 −10+ 0 5
55 −133 −36 −04 −122 −29 −08 −110 −23 −12
60 −193 −75 −30 −184 −66 −30 −174 −58 −30
65 −292 −116 −38 −281 −107 −36 −269 −97 −35
The Table considers a permanent (compensated) 5% tax increase that takes
eﬀect at either age 25,a g e30 or age 35. The table reports how this tax increase
alters a person’s labor supply at 5-year intervals from age 25 to age 65.F o r
instance, suppose the 5% tax increase goes into eﬀect (unexpectedly) when the
worker is 25. Then, at age 25, his labor supply is reduced by 27% (the same ﬁgure
as we reported in Table 1). But, as the worker grows older, the negative eﬀect
on labor supply increases substantially. For instance, by age 45 it is −51%,a n d
by age 60 it is −193%. Thus, in response to a permanent tax increase, workers
not only reduce labor supply, but also shift their lifetime labor supply out of older
ages towards younger ages.
28Why does the eﬀect of a permanent tax increase grow with age? There are
two reasons. The ﬁr s ti st h es a m er e a s o nt h a te ﬀects of transitory tax increases
are greater for older workers. As a worker gets older, the after-tax wage makes up
a larger fraction of the OCT, so a given tax has a larger direct eﬀect. The second
reason involves the dynamics of the human capital model. To the extent that a
worker reduces his labor supply at time , he will have less human capital at time
 +1 . This causes the worker to work even less at time  +1 , leading to a lower
wage at  +2 ,e t c . .
This “snowball” eﬀect of a permanent tax increase on after-tax wages is also
evident in Table 2. At ﬁrst, tax eﬀects on human capital are modest, but they
grow substantially with age. For instance, we see that if a 5% tax increase is
instituted when a worker is 25,t h e nb ya g e40 h i sw a g ei sr e d u c e db yo n l y10%,
but by age 55 h i sw a g ei sr e d u c e db y36%,a n db ya g e60 the reduction is 75%.
So, eventually, the pre-tax wage reduction due to the tax increase is greater than
the tax increase itself.
An important implication of these results, emphasized in Keane (2009), is that
in a model with human capital, changes in taxes cannot be viewed as a source of
exogenous variation in after-tax wages for the purpose of identifying labor supply
elasticities. The behavioral responses induced by tax changes feed back and alter
the life-cycle wage path itself. Or, as asserted by Imai and Keane (2004), in
the human capital model there is simply no such thing as an exogenous wage
change.21 It follows that elasticities estimated from quasi-experimental evidence
21Keane (2009) discusses the implications of this statement for estimation of labor supply
elasticities — i.e., nothing short of full structural estimation of the joint labor supply/human
29on responses to exogenous changes in tax rates are not easily interpretable in
terms of underlying preference parameters.
Finally, Table 2 also reports how asset accumulation over the life-cycle re-
sponds to permanent tax changes. The basic pattern is that, upon implementa-
tion of the tax, savings ﬁrst increase, while later, savings fall. For example, given
a 5% permanent tax increase at age 25, a worker responds so as to increase his
assets by 263% at age 35, but ends up with assets that are 38% lower at the age
of retirement (age 65).22 In other words, a permanent tax increase reduces con-
sumption in the short run by more than the amount of the tax, not only because
labor supply falls, but also because the savings rate increases. However, we see in
Table 2 that the magnitude of the increase in savings following the tax increase,
as well as the drop in assets at retirement, are less if the tax is implemented when
t h ew o r k e ri so l d e r .
The reason a permanent tax increase generates more saving in the short to
medium run is precisely the “snowball” eﬀect of the tax on wage growth described
earlier. Given that a tax increase reduces labor supply, a worker knows that his
rate of wage growth has been reduced. So the asset response pattern is as one
would expect — young workers consume less today if their perceived life-cycle wage
path is ﬂattened. This inﬂu e n c eo ft h ep e r c e i v e dl i f e - c y c l ew a g ep a t ho nc u r r e n t
consumption is a central issue in the papers by Domeij and Floden (2006) and
Low (2005) that we will discuss in the next two sections.
capital investment process is adequate for estimating labor supply elasticities.
22Note that the Imai and Keane (2004) model includes a motive to carry assets into retirement,
both to ﬁnance retirement and to leave bequests.
30An important question about the Imai-Keane model can be stated as
follows: Suppose this model did in fact generate the data. Would a researcher
using methods like those in MaCurdy (1981), Browning et al (1985) and Altonji
(1986) to study data generated by the model conclude that the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution is small?23 Imai and Keane (2004) addressed this question
by (i) simulating data from their model, and (ii) applying instrumental variable
methods like those in MaCurdy (1981) and Altonji (1986) to obtain estimates
of  in equations similar to (2.10). In conducting this exercise, they obtain an
estimate of 325 (standard error = 256) using the MaCurdy (1981) approach,
and 476 (standard error = 182) using the Altonji (1986) approach. Thus, the
Imai-Keane model generates life-cycle histories that, when viewed through the
lens of models that ignore human capital, do imply rather small values for the
Frisch elasticity.
As further conﬁrmation of this point, the authors report simple OLS regres-
sions of hours changes on wage changes for both the NLSY79 data and the data
simulated from their model. The estimates are −0231 and −0293, respectively.
Thus, a negative correlation between hours changes and wage changes in the raw
data is perfectly consistent with the high willingness to substitute labor inter-
temporally over the life cycle that we see in Tables 1-2.
What reconciles these prima facie contradictory observations is, of course, the
divergence between the OCT and the wage in a model with human capital. In
p a r t i c u l a r ,I m a ia n dK e a n e( 2 0 0 4 )e s t i m a t et h a tf r o ma g e20 to 36 the mean of
23We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting the importance of this question.
31the opportunity cost of time increases by only 13%. In contrast, the mean wage
rate increases by 90% in the actual data, and 86% in the simulated data. Thus,
the wage increases about 65 times faster than the OCT. These ﬁgures imply that
conventional methods of calculating  will understate it by a factor of roughly
65.24
3.2. Borrowing Constraints
In a model with credit constraints, consumption and labor supply decisions no
longer separate. Reallocation of hours across time requires reallocating consump-
tion across time as well, and so an individuals’ willingness to substitute labor
intertemporally is potentially limited by their willingness to reallocate consump-
tion over time.25 Technically, the Frisch elasticity, deﬁned as the change in hours
in response to the change in the wage, holding the marginal utility of consumption
ﬁxed, no longer exists. That is, any reallocation of hours to the current period and
away from other periods will reduce the marginal utility of consumption in the
current period while increasing it in other periods. Still, while the Frisch elasticity
24It is interesting that French (2005), in a study of retirement behavior, also obtains a rather
large labor supply elasticity for 60 year olds in the PSID. As both Shaw (1989) and Imai and
Keane (2004) note, human capital investment is not so important for people late in the life-
cycle. For them, the wage will be close to the opportunity cost of time, and the bias that results
from ignoring human capital will be much less severe. In French (2005), however, the reason
elasticities are greater for older workers is that for them the extensive margin is more important,
in the sense that more of them are close to indiﬀerent between working and not working. We
discuss the importance of the extensive margin below.
25The decisions about consumption and hours also do not separate if hours and consumption
are complements in utility (see MaCurdy (1983)). If the degree of complementarity is great
enough, consumption will closely track hours. The positive association between consumption
and labor income might suggest that individuals are credit constrained when in fact they are
not. See Heckman (1974b) for a discussion of this issue.
32concept no longer applies, the more general concept of an intertemporal elasticity
of substitution in labor supply still applies.
Domeij and Floden (2006) argue that the existence of credit constraints
may explain why researchers tend to obtain low estimates of the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution when estimating MaCurdy (1981)-type equations like
(2.10). They consider a model in which a household may save, but faces a non-
negativity constraint on assets. Given this environment, consider the situation of a
worker who is hit by a temporary negative wage shock. If borrowing were possible,
the person would reduce hours in the current period and borrow against future
income to smooth consumption. Similarly, even if borrowing were not possible,
if the person had a stock of wealth then he/she could run it down to smooth
consumption. But if borrowing is not possible, and the person has little or no
wealth, then he/she can only smooth consumption by actually increasing labor
supply in the current period. Thus, the non-negativity constraint on assets may
actually reverse the expected sign of the intertemporal labor supply elasticity, at
least for the segment of consumers with low wealth holdings. Thus, if such workers
are prevalent in the data, it will attenuate the estimated hours response to wage
changes.
Domeij and Floden (2006) also argue that credit constraints are important
in the U.S. economy, and that a large fraction of households hold little wealth.
That a large fraction of U.S. households hold little wealth appears to be well
established empirically — see Deaton (1991) or Diaz-Gimenez, Quadrini and Rios-
Rull (1997). The latter paper ﬁnds that the bottom 40% of the U.S. wealth
33distribution own only 14% of the capital stock.
Whether households are credit constrained is obviously a much more diﬃ-
cult question; i.e., whether households hold little wealth is “simply” a matter of
measurement, while assessing whether households are credit constrained involves
making inferences from their behavior. Indeed, the literature on testing for exis-
tence of credit constraints is rather controversial, and it is diﬃcult to claim there
is a clear consensus on whether credit constraints are quantitatively important for
describing consumption and/or labor supply behavior. Domeij and Floden (2006)
appeal to the work of Japelli (1990) on the number of households who report being
rejected for credit in the Survey of Consumer Finances, as providing evidence for
the importance of credit constraints. Some other notable papers in this literature
include Zeldes (1989), Keane and Runkle (1992), Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes
(1995) and Keane and Wolpin (2001). It is beyond the scope of the present sur-
vey to assess the large literature on credit constraints and consumption, so, like
Domeij and Floden (2006), we will simply assume their existence and examine
their implications for labor supply elasticities.
The model that Domeij and Floden (2006) use to assess the impact of
credit constraints consists of three components. The ﬁrst is a period utility func-
















The individual discounts future utility at rate . The second is the asset accumu-
34lation constraint:
 =( 1+)[ +  − ]  ≥ 0 (3.3)
And the third component is the stochastic process for wages:
log =  +  where  = −1 +  (3.4)
An important point to note is that the MaCurdy (1981) procedure to esti-
mate the preference parameter  does not require one to specify a particular wage
process. Estimation of preference parameters using (2.10) only requires speciﬁca-
tion of a set of instruments that are (i) correlated with anticipated wage changes,
(ii) uncorrelated with surprise wage changes, (iii) uncorrelated with tastes for
work, and (iv) uncorrelated with measurement error in wages. However, as we
have already seen, once we introduce extensions to the basic life-cycle model,
such as human capital accumulation or credit constraints, it becomes necessary
to specify the complete model, including the wage process.
Let  denote the marginal utility of borrowing for person  at time .O f
course  =0when optimal assets are positive, but it is positive if the (nominal)
optimal asset level is negative (so the non-negativity constraint is binding). In
this case the marginal utility of consumption evolves according to:




35and hence (2.10) becomes:
∆log = ∆(1 − ) − 
−1
−1
−  log(1 + )+∆ + ∆ (3.6)
The additional term −1−1 can be interpreted as an omitted variable in
the conventional IV estimation method. As Domeij and Floden (2006) point out,
a higher expected wage increase from period  − 1 to  will tend to increase the
marginal utility of borrowing at time −1. That is, ceteris paribus, a steeper future
wage proﬁle increases one’s desire to borrow against future income to ﬁnance
current consumption. Thus, −1 will be positively correlated with expected
wage changes. Also, a higher expected wage increase from −1 to  increases the
worker’s perceived wealth, and this reduces the marginal utility of consumption at
time −1. Thus, the entire term −1−1 is positively correlated with expected
wage growth.
As is evident from equation (3.6), the term −1−1 also has a negative
direct eﬀect on hours growth. That is, in periods when people are liquidity con-
strained (i.e., the non-negativity constraint is binding and −1  0), they will
tend to work more than they would if they could borrow against future income.
Thus, the omitted variable −1−1 is positively correlated with expected wage
growth and negatively correlated with hours growth. Hence, its omission, as in
the conventional estimation procedure, will lead to a downward bias in the wage
growth coeﬃcient .26
26While Domeij and Floden (2006) do not discuss this issue, it is worth noting that the credit
36To proceed, Domeij and Floden (2006) calibrate their model using the
parameter values {} = {090021034} obtained from estimates in Flo-
den and Linde (2001). Note that the values of  and  imply a high degree of
individual persistence in wages due to autoregressive errors and time invariant
individual heterogeneity. To assess the impact of credit constraints it is crucial to
u s ear e a s o n a b l ev a l u ef o rt h ev a r i a n c eo ft r a n s i t o r yw a g es h o c k s .T h ev a l u eo f
=0 21 is low compared to what one typically sees in raw wage data. It is consis-
tent with the idea that a substantial fraction of observed wage variation is actually
measurement error. In the utility function they set  =2 3 and  = 50.27 In
a model without credit constraints, this would of course imply a Frisch elasticity
that is also equal to 05.
Domeij and Floden (2006) then follow a procedure similar to Imai and Keane
(2004): They simulate data from the model, and apply MaCurdy (1981) and
Altonji (1986) estimation procedures to this simulated data. As they are using
simulated data they can make the estimates as precise as desired, obviating any
need to consider standard errors. Using the full sample, which has roughly 200000
observations, their estimate of  is 023. But if they restrict the sample to the
roughly 157000 observations with positive assets, they obtain 044.A n di ft h e y
constraint variable −1−1is endogenous in equation (3.6). It should not be correlated with
the error component , because  is by deﬁnition a surprise not yet revealed at time  − 1.
However, −1−1 can be correlated with the change in tastes for work ∆,a st h e s em a y
be expected at  − 1. If a worker expects his tastes for work to increase from  − 1 to  (e.g.,
he is recovering from an illness) then he would want to borrow more at  − 1. Thus, even if
−1−1 could be measured (and some authors have attempted this by including proxies for
credit constraints) it must be instrumented for to estimate (3.6).
27These parameter values replicate the statistic from the U.S. data, noted earlier, that the
bottom 40% of households hold only 14% of wealth.
37further restrict the sample to roughly 60000 observations with assets above the
sample mean, they obtain 050.28 These ﬁgures suggest that credit constraints
can substantially reduce estimates of the utility function parameter .
Unfortunately, Domeij and Floden (2006) fall into an interpretation error when
they go on to state that “... ignoring liquidity constraints ... the estimated
elasticity is then 023 ... [while] the true elasticity is 050.” As we emphasized
when discussing Imai and Keane (2004), once one extends the basic life-cycle
model to include features like human capital or credit constraints, there is no
longer a direct mapping from the preference parameter  to the intertemporal
labor supply elasticity. Thus, what they should be concluding is that the mapping
from regression coeﬃcients to preference parameters is aﬀected by the presence
of credit constraints, and failing to take this into account will lead to mistaken
i n f e r e n c er e g a r d i n gt h et r u ev a l u eo ft h e underlying preference parameters.
Domeij and Floden (2006) also report estimates of the intertemporal elasticity
using PSID data on male household heads. As they need to use wealth data
to attempt to ascertain if households are credit constrained, they can only use
the 1984, 1989 and 1994 waves (which collected wealth information). When they
use the full sample (1277 observations) and instrument for wage changes using a
polynomial in age and education, they obtain an elasticity of 042 (standard error
025). But when they restrict the sample to households with liquid wealth equal
to at least one month’s income, the estimate increases to 128 (standard error
28Finally, if they use data on the 68000 households with assets below 10% of the mean, they
obtain a wage coeﬃcient of −009. This is consistent with the example given at the start of this
section to the eﬀect that a household with little wealth may actually increase hours in response
to a wage reduction.
38115).29
These results are consistent with the idea that credit constraints substantially
dampen the intertemporal labor supply response. One implication is that the
preference parameter  may be considerably larger than prior estimates suggest.
A n df o rs o m ep o l i c i e si tm a yb et h ep r e f e r e n c ep a r a m e t e r, not the intertemporal
elasticity, that matters. For example, to predict the impact of a policy that
relaxes credit constraints, we would need to know  itself. Unfortunately, Domeij
and Floden (2006) do not explore implications of their calibrated model for such
policies.
Another implication is that labor supply responses may be much more elastic
for higher income workers. As such workers make up a disproportionate share
of the tax base, the elasticity of revenue with respect to taxes may substantially
exceed that of labor supply. (See Saez, Slemrod and Giertz (2009) for a survey of
the recently emerging literature on the elasticity of taxable income with respect
to tax rates).
However, before drawing any conclusions, a number of caveats are in order.
Notice that the standard errors on the Domeij-Floden PSID estimates are so large
that it is hard to draw any clear conclusions about the intertemporal elasticity. A
95% conﬁdence interval takes it from near zero to two, and a formal test would
29These estimates are reported in Table 6 column 4 of Domeij and Floden (2006). We feel this
column gives their most reliable estimates. In other speciﬁcations, they use an alternative wage
change measure as an additional instrument, following a procedure suggested by Altonji (1986).
However, this procedure is only valid under the assumption of perfect foresight, as otherwise
any wage change measure is correlated with the surprise term  in the hours change equation.
Altonji’s procedure is only intended to deal with measurement error (i.e., using one noisy wage
change measure to instrument for another).
39probably not reject equality of the estimates in the full sample vs. the high
asset sample. This is another manifestation of the weak instrument problem
(i.e., age/education polynomials do not predict wage changes well) that we noted
earlier.
A related paper is that by Low (2005). He explores the implications of unin-
surable wage risk for the life-cycle path of labor supply. In his model wages are
assumed to follow an exogenous stochastic process. The key idea in his model is
that workers know that the typical life-cycle wage path has a hump-shape like that
in our Figure 1. However, young workers also perceive that there is considerable
uncertainty about the extent of life-cycle wage growth that they will experience
personally — and they cannot insure against this uncertainty.
Hence, to the extent that there is a strong precautionary motive, workers will
not choose to borrow against expected future income to ﬁnance higher consump-
tion when they are young. Furthermore, workers will have an incentive to work
relatively long hours when they are young, despite low wages. By doing so they
build up a buﬀer stock of assets that serves as self-insurance against the potential
adverse outcome that wage growth over the life cycle turns out to be much less
than expected.
The essential idea of Low’s model can be clearly seen by looking at his Figure
6. In a simulation where workers have certainty about the wage path, hours rise
steeply over the life-cycle as wages increase (see panel b). Also, workers go heavily
into debt to ﬁnance higher consumption when young, and pay oﬀ this debt in their
40sa n d50s when the wage proﬁle peaks (see panel c). However, the introduction
40of uncertainty changes behavior substantially. Under uncertainty, hours are much
higher at young ages, and hours’ growth is greatly attenuated. Indeed, hours now
follow a mildly curved upside-down U-shape over the life-cycle similar to that
observed in the data. As for assets, workers no longer go into debt in their 20s,
and they begin to accumulate assets in their 30s.
A researcher who looked at data generated from Low’s model using MaCurdy
(1981) type methods to estimate equations like (2.10) would again conclude that
t h ev a l u eo ft h ep r e f e r e n c ep a r a m e t e r was quite small. Hence, if the insurance
mechanism that Low describes is quantitatively important, it is again the case
that the preference parameter  may be considerably larger than prior estimates
suggest. And again, for some policies it may be the preference parameter ,
not the intertemporal elasticity, that matters. For example, consider a policy that
enhanced social insurance, such as more generous insurance against unemployment
or health risks (or against any other outcomes that might lead to negative wage
shocks in middle age). In Low’s model this might be expected to induce workers
to work substantially fewer hours when young. But a model with a low value of
 would not generate that outcome. Unfortunately, Low (2005) did not use his
m o d e lt oe x p l o r ea n yp o l i c ys i m u l a t i o n s .
Of course, while the qualitative results that are generated by Low’s model
stem directly from uninsurable wage risk, the quantitative results hinge on the
speciﬁcation of the wage process (in particular the degree of uncertainty) and
preferences (in particular the strength of the precautionary motive). Low (2005)








where  is now leisure of individual  in period .I n t h i s s p e c i ﬁcation  plays
multiple roles. First, it determines the degree of curvature of the utility function
in the consumption/leisure composite. As  decreases, the degree of curvature in-
creases. More curvature implies, loosely speaking, that consumers are less willing
to substitute utility across periods. That is, if hours are to be set high in a period,
consumers desire to set consumption high as well (to compensate). Thus, a lower
 dampens the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in labor supply. Second,
and for the same reason, a lower  also increases the precautionary savings motive
(as consumers have more of an incentive to insure against ﬂuctuations in ).
In his baseline model Low sets  =1 22,a n d = 4, based on estimates
from Attanasio and Weber (1995). He assumes a wage process that includes a
deterministic quadratic in age with a peak at age 50 (so as to match the inverted U-
s h a p ei no u rF i g u r e1 ) ,a sw e l la sp e r m a n e n ta n dt r a n s i t o r yw a g es h o c k s .B a s e do n
estimates from Meghir and Pistaferri (2004), the standard deviation of permanent
shocks is set to 018 and that of transitory shocks is set to 017. These values seem
plausible in light of other existing estimates.
The diﬀerence between Low (2005) and Domeij and Floden (2006) is that
in the former paper workers do not borrow against future income when young
because they do not want to, while in the latter they do not borrow when young
because they cannot. This illustrates the point we made at the beginning of this
42section about why credit constraints are diﬃcult to identify empirically: they
generate behavior that looks very similar to behavior generated by several other
mechanisms: a strong precautionary motive, complementarity of consumption and
hours, time varying tastes for work/consumption, etc.. Ignoring any one of these
mechanisms can potentially lead studies based on equation (2.10) to obtain biased
estimates of preferences.
3.3. Optimization Frictions
Chetty (2010) oﬀers a diﬀerent explanation for why the small estimated labor
supply elasticities in many studies may be biased. In particular, he considers
the implications of ﬁxed costs of adjusting labor supply for estimates of labor
supply elasticities. He argues that ﬁxed adjustment costs may arise for a number
of reasons. Such costs may be features of the technology (e.g., one may have to
deal with various organizational details to adjust one’s work hours or search for a
new job at a diﬀerent ﬁrm). Alternatively, these “ﬁx e dc o s t s ”m a yb ear e d u c e d
form representation of mental phenomena such as optimization errors or psychic
costs (i.e., a cost of doing the necessary mental calculations to re-optimize when
tax rates change). A related idea is that not all tax changes are “salient” (i.e.,
people ignore them) because any gains from adjusting to them are too small to
be concerned with.
Chetty’s approach to the problem of adjustments costs is rather diﬀerent from
papers we have discussed so far in that he does not actually solve or estimate an
extension of a basic labor supply model that incorporates ﬁxed costs of adjustment.
43Rather, he attempts to bound the magnitude of the bias in labor supply elasticity
estimates that might reasonably be attributed to ignoring ﬁxed costs. The basic
question that Chetty asks is this: Suppose that when taxes change, people do not
ﬁnd it optimal (or cannot be bothered) to adjust their labor supply if the resultant
loss in welfare is less than some small fraction () of consumption, where that
fraction represents the ﬁxed cost.30 In that case, what is the bias in conventional
estimates of labor supply elasticities (that ignore costs of adjustment) likely to
be?
One might well expect that adjustment costs would not lead to any particular
bias in labor supply elasticities. If people often do not bother to respond to small
tax changes, it also follows that when they do respond they will occasionally make
very large adjustments — e.g., a small tax change may follow a series of prior small
changes that have left the person rather far from his/her optimal hours point, and
one additional small change may then induce a large jump in hours.
But the somewhat surprising conclusion that Chetty draws is that elas-
ticity estimates are likely to be biased downward. This stems from an asymmetry
in how adjustment costs aﬀect behavior when elasticities are high vs. low: If the
labor supply elasticity is large it means the objective function is fairly ﬂat in the
vicinity of optimal hours. Thus, the converse of the labor supply elasticity being
large is that a fairly large departure from optimal hours will lead to only a small
30While the idea of consumers not putting in the mental eﬀort to adjust when the gains would
be small has intuitive appeal, it runs into a logical lacuna in practice: One has to calculate the
gain in the ﬁrst place to determine if it would be small. So, if one has to do the mental eﬀort
anyway, why not adjust? This is not to say that mental eﬀort is not important, only that it is
diﬃcult to model formally.
44welfare loss. So if labor supply elasticities are large, we may easily observe small
labor supply responses to taxes provided there are small adjustment costs. In con-
trast, if labor supply elasticities are small, then small adjustment costs provide
no mechanism that would cause us to infer they are large.
To give an extreme example, Keane (2010) surveys 21 well-known studies
that estimate the Hicks elasticity, and ﬁnds that 13 produce very small estimates
(near zero) while 8 produce fairly large estimates (030 or above). In Chetty’s
framework, such a distribution of estimates would be unsurprising if the “true”
elasticity were large. But it would be diﬃcult to rationalize if the “true” elas-
ticity were small. Thus, a researcher faced with these estimates would conclude
the “true” elasticity is probably fairly large. Of course, this example is extreme
b e c a u s ei ti g n o r e sa l lt h ed i ﬀerences between the studies (i.e., it assumes that the
studies represent iid draws from a distribution of possible estimation outcomes).
One could still rationalize a small elasticity by arguing that all the studies that
produced large elasticities were ﬂawed in some way. But this example does clearly
illustrate Chetty’s basic idea
To proceed, we assume a simple quasi-linear utility function31:








As there are no income eﬀects, the Marshall, Hicks and Frisch elasticities are
31Chetty shows how the results can be extended to the case of utility functions that are more
commonly used in the literature. But it is much easier to exposit the ideas in the quasi-linear
case.




















Now, consider a change in the after-tax rate (1 − ). The impact on utility
can be decomposed into the direct eﬀect of the change in the tax rate holding the
















From (3.7), the ﬁr s tt e r mo nt h er i g h th a n ds i d ei so b v i o u s l yj u s t∗
∆(1−),




. Thus, the second term on the right hand side of (3.10) — the
hours adjustment term — is a second order eﬀect that can be ignored for purposes of
calculating eﬀects of small tax changes (of course, this is just a simple application
of the envelope theorem).
The idea that utility gains from adjusting hours are only second order is
the key to Chetty’s idea that agents will not make these adjustments if there are
46small adjustment costs. The utility gains from hours adjustments are captured





















Dividing the second order term by consumption, we get that the utility gain from
adjusting hours to a change is approximately 1
2[
∆(1−)
(1−) ]2.T h u s , f o r e x a m p l e ,i f
 =1and the tax rate falls from 33% to 30%, the utility loss from failing to adjust
hours is only about 01% of initial consumption. In contrast, for a larger tax cut
from 40% to 30% (a 25% cut) the utility loss is about 3% of consumption, as the
second order eﬀects become important.
However, for any assumed values of  and  ( t h ea d j u s t m e n tc o s ta sa
fraction of consumption) one can work out whether people would adjust to a
particular tax change (assuming they start from optimal hours). Chetty then looks
at the U.S. Tax Reform act of 1986 (TRA86), which ﬂattened the progressive tax
system by reducing rates in a way that was biased toward the high end. Assuming
 = 5,h eﬁnds that the cost of failing to adjust hours in response to TRA86 was
generally less than 1% of consumption for people earning $100000 or less, but
t h a tt h el o s sg r e wt o4% of consumption at the $200000 level. Thus, Chetty
argues that an adjustment cost of roughly  =1 %could rationalize the empirical
ﬁnding that middle income workers had little response to TRA86 (see Gruber
32Note that the second order term in the Taylor series approximates the second term on
the right hand side of (3.10) — the hours adjustment term — but is not equivalent to it. The
divergence will become greater for very large tax changes where the higher order terms matter.
47and Saez (2002), Saez (2004)) while high income workers had large responses (see
Auten and Carroll (1999), Saez (2004)).
Now suppose we require that the utility loss from failing to adjust hours
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lizing this and the assumption that hours were at their optimal level at ,w e









This expression clariﬁes the point about asymmetry we made earlier. If  is small,
then, for a given , hours must stay close to their optimal level. Thus, it is unlikely
we will see a large hours response to a small tax change. But if  is large we can
see large deviations of hours from the optimum, so it is plausible to see negligible
responses to moderate tax changes.
Chetty uses the bound on hours changes to derive bounds on elasticities, given
observed hours responses to tax changes. As the estimated elasticity is the ob-
served percent change in hours divided by the percentage change in (1 − ),i ti s
clear that the observed elasticity in a study may depart from the true one by plus
or minus [2]12∆log(1−), assuming workers start at an optimum at time .33
33If that assumption is not invoked (as is the case in Chetty (2010)), the width of the bounds
doubles.
48As the change in tax rates appears in the denominator of the bounds, they will
be wider for smaller tax changes.34
This argument suggests that estimates of labor supply elasticities in diﬀerent
contexts could lead to a range of estimated elasticities even if the true underlying
elasticity was the same in all cases. Speciﬁcally, he argues that estimates from
contexts in which wages or taxes changed relatively little might be expected to
generate elasticity estimates that were biased toward zero, so that the true value
of the preference parameter  might be signiﬁcantly larger than the estimated
coeﬃcient on wages or taxes. In this sense, his conclusion is similar in spirit to
those of Imai and Keane (2004), Domeij and Floden (2006) and Low (2005) that
we have discussed previously. However, one diﬀerence with Imai and Keane, for
example, is that while they estimate the features of the human capital accumula-
tion technology jointly with the preference parameters of interest, Chetty simply
considers the implications of various values of  that are chosen without reference
to the data.35 He goes on to argue that this same logic can help us understand
why elasticity estimates based on aggregate data are typically larger than those
based on micro data. The reason for this is that the variation in taxes in aggregate
studies is often larger than in micro studies.
A good illustration of this point is Chetty’s analysis of MaCurdy (1981), as-
suming  =0 01. As he states “... even though MaCurdy (1981) estimates an
34Note that, as the bounds depend on the elasticity  itself, we actually obtain an implicit
equation, which Chetty solves to obtain an explicit expression for the bounds. In this expression,
the square of the percentage change in the tax rate appears in the denominator.
35Chetty et al (2011) consider a speciﬁc friction—search costs—and pursue a more structural
approach that is consistent with the ideas in Chetty (2010).
49intensive margin elasticity of only 015, his estimate is consistent with a structural
elasticity as large as  =5 63. The reason is that MaCurdy’s estimates are iden-
tiﬁed from changes in wage rates of approximately 10%, which is not big enough
to overcome small frictions.”
Similarly, the Blundell et al (1998) study identiﬁed labor supply elasticities
for employed married women, by exploiting UK tax rate variation from 1978-92.
They obtained a modest value for the compensated elasticity of 0.20, but Chetty
(2010) derives bounds on their estimate that range from essentially zero to 2.54.
In general, the message is that if we admit the possibility of small adjustment
costs, then the best known micro data studies that have estimated small (intensive
margin) elasticities do not actually rule out large elasticities (although they do
not rule them in either!).
Chetty (2010) also applies his methodology to the data in Prescott (2004)’s
analysis by identifying labor supply elasticities based on diﬀerential aggregate
hours and tax rate changes between the U.S. and the UK from 1979-1996. Here
the bounds are 0.42 to 2.14. They are tighter because the relative tax changes
were quite large. In fact, this turns out to be one of the most informative studies
that Chetty examined in the sense of generating a relatively large lower bound.36
Another implication that Chetty notes is that estimated elasticities may de-
p e n do nt h el e n g t ho ft i m et h a th a se l a p s e ds i n c et h ec h a n g ei nt a x e s .O n er e a s o n
for this is that adjustment costs might exhibit random ﬂuctuations, so that the
36Of course, a key issue here is that other factors may have also shifted labor supply in the
US vs. the UK over the sample period. More generally,just as estimates from micro data face
several econometric issues, the issue of omitted factors is a key issue for estimates based on
aggregate data.
50more time that has passed, the more likely it is that an individual has had a low
realization of these costs and has therefore adjusted labor supply.
Finally, Chetty examines several studies that look at the elasticity of taxable
income (ETI) with respect to tax rates. Since Feldstein (1995) a large literature
has grown up around this topic in public ﬁnance. The basic idea is that taxable
income may be quite responsive to tax rates even if labor supply is not. This is be-
cause people have mechanisms to shield income from taxes, but these mechanisms
require eﬀort, and higher taxes increase the optimal level of eﬀort to devote to tax
avoidance (or income shifting). An essential idea from the optimal tax literature
is that if income is more elastic with respect to the tax rate then the optimal
rate is lower. Thus, even if labor supply is quite inelastic, it may nevertheless be
optimal to have low tax rates if taxable income is highly elastic.
We do not discuss this ETI literature further here, primarily because the point
of the literature is conceptually quite diﬀerent from our focus. In eﬀect, the ETI
literature is an attempt to reconcile an argument against high tax rates with the
“inconvenient” evidence of low labor supply elasticities — by arguing, as Feldstein
(1995) did, that the ETI is nevertheless large. In contrast, we seek to argue
that the existing evidence on labor supply can be reconciled with a world where
labor supply elasticities are in fact large. In particular, if the Hicks labor supply
elasticity is actually large then one can obviously construct an argument that
welfare costs of taxation are high without having to resort to arguments about
tax avoidance.37
37A second reason we do not discuss the ETI literature is that it has not yet come to any
clear conclusions about the size of the ETI. For instance, the survey by Saez, Slemrod and
513.4. Summary
The main conclusion of this section is that when one adds empirically plausible
features to the simple benchmark model of Section 2, the mapping from coeﬃ-
cients in a prototypical regression equation such as equation (2.10) to underlying
preference parameters can be drastically altered. Additionally, the implications
of a particular value of the preference parameter  for how individual and aggre-
gate labor supply respond to various tax policies is also aﬀected. Some pieces of
conventional wisdom may even be overturned. For example, with human capital
accumulation, the hours responses to temporary shocks can be smaller than the
hours responses to permanent shocks. With credit constraints, the immediate
response to a temporary decrease in wages may even be to increase hours.
4. Aggregate Labor Supply In Models with Extensive Mar-
gin Adjustment
In section 2 we embedded a simple life cycle labor supply problem into a stan-
dard aggregate model. A key property of that benchmark model is that a single
preference parameter, , played a key role in determining how individual life cycle
labor supply as well as aggregate labor supply respond to speciﬁc changes in the
Giertz (2009) states: “Estimates of the long-run elasticity of taxable income are plagued by
extremely diﬃcult issues of identiﬁcation, so diﬃcult that we believe that there are no convincing
estimates of the long-run elasticity of reported taxable income to changes in the marginal tax
rate.” Furthermore, Slemrod and Kopczuk (2000) argue that, even in models where the labor
supply elasticity is a primitive parameter of preferences, the ETI will not be. For instance, a
reform that broadens the tax base (like TRA86) would lower the ETI by making income shifting
more diﬃcult. This non-invariance makes any structural interpretation of ETI estimates quite
problematic.
52economic environment. In particular, we showed explicitly in the context of a
simple tax and transfer policy that the individual and aggregate elasticities were
identical functions of this one preference parameter. Key to this result was the
fact that in this benchmark model, the tax and transfer policy induces a uniform
shift of the life cycle labor supply proﬁle, so that knowledge of the shift in labor
supply at any one point in the life cycle is a suﬃcient statistic for the change
in both lifetime and aggregate labor supply. The life cycle labor supply prob-
lem in this benchmark model is consistent with the earlier estimation exercises of
MaCurdy (1981) and others. The previous section studied how various extensions
to this simple life cycle model inﬂuence the estimated values of the key preference
parameter and its implication for various labor supply elasticities. In this section
we take up a diﬀerent issue which also relates to the connection between the value
of this particular preference parameter and the responsiveness of aggregate labor
supply to various changes in the economic environment.
The key feature of the models discussed in this section relative to the bench-
mark model from Section 2 will be the presence of an extensive margin. As a
historical note, it is of interest to note that more than 25 years ago in his joint
discussion of one micro and one macro paper on labor supply, Heckman (1984)
called for the development of labor supply models that featured both intensive
and extensive margins in order to have a uniﬁed theory capable of reconciling
individual and aggregate features of labor supply.
The starting point for our discussion are the papers by Hansen (1985) and
Rogerson (1988), who studied homogeneous agent models in which all adjust-
53ment at the individual level was assumed to occur at the extensive margin, i.e.,
the intensive margin was ﬁxed by assumption. Speciﬁcally, it was assumed that





The assumption that all adjustment occurs at the extensive margin was captured
by the constraint that the individual’s choice of  had to lie in the ﬁnite set {0ˆ }.
A key early result in this literature was that assuming a set of markets suﬃciently
rich to decentralize optimal allocations, the aggregate allocations in this economy
were identical to those that would emerge from an economy in which there was a
representative household that made all labor supply adjustment at the intensive





where  is a constant. The importance of this equivalence result is that this rep-
resentative household behaves as if they have a Frisch elasticity equal to inﬁnity,
and that this is true independently of the function (1−) that described the true
preferences of individuals in the economy. It should be clear to the reader that
this result potentially creates a serious disconnect between micro data estima-
tion exercises in which researchers estimate parameters of (), and the associated
implications for aggregate behavior.
However, there are a few issues concerning this result that are worth noting.
54First, because the choice set of individuals in this economy is not convex, the
early derivations of this result assumed that individuals in the economy could
trade lotteries in the decentralized equilibrium. That is, individuals could sell a
lottery in which they work with probability  and do not work with probability
1−. To the extent that we do not observe workers and ﬁrms trading these types
of lotteries, one might question the relevance of this result if this feature of the
decentralization is essential. However, subsequent work has argued that lotteries
are not essential to this result. Ljungqvist and Sargent (2006, 2008) argue that
“time averaging” is a perfect substitute for lotteries if an individual has access to
credit markets. The basic idea is that if there are many time periods, then working
each period with probability  is equivalent to working with certainty during a
fraction  of the periods. In the equilibrium with lotteries, the individual receives
a smooth stream of compensation. In the equilibrium with “time averaging”,
the compensation proﬁle is no longer smooth, since the individual only receives
income in those periods in which he or she works. But as long as the individual has
access to credit markets, all that matters is the present value of the compensation
proﬁle. Ljungqvist and Sargent establish this formally in an environment with
ﬁnite lifetimes, continuous time and no discounting. Krusell et al (2008) extend
this result to the case of inﬁnitely lived agents in discrete time with discounting.
Browning et al (1999) raised another issue concerning the relevance of the
above equivalence result. Speciﬁcally, they argued that in order to be empirically
relevant, a model of choice along the extensive margin should be able to capture
the movements of individual workers into and out of employment. With this in
55mind they suggested that the lottery equilibria in Hansen (1985) had the counter-
factual implication that all workers were equally likely to be employed next period,
independently of their current employment status. While this critique does apply
to the speciﬁc equilibrium that Hansen studied, it turns out that equilibrium does
not impose any restrictions on the nature of individual transitions. One way to
see this is to note that in the time averaging equilibrium that Ljungqvist and
Sargent (2006, 2008) studied, all that is required is that individuals spend a cer-
tain fraction of their life in employment. That is, any proﬁle for employment that
implies the same total labor supply over an individual’s lifetime is consistent with
individual optimization. However, one could amend the Browning et al critique
and argue that a defect of the Rogerson and Hansen model is that it does not
impose any discipline on individual employment histories. Given the many em-
pirical regularities that have been documented, this could be interpreted to imply
that the model is missing some important features. To the extent that this is the
case, the possibility arises that the result would not be robust to the inclusion of
these additional features.
Related to this, Cho (1995) and Mulligan (2001) showed that the implication
of an inﬁnite Frisch elasticity for aggregate labor supply was not robust to al-
lowing for certain kinds of heterogeneity. More generally, the Frisch elasticity for
aggregate labor supply would depend on the nature and extent of heterogeneity.
Finally, another issue of interest is that the simple aggregate models of Hansen
and Rogerson do not speak to the issue of reconciling the features of life cycle labor
supply with properties of aggregate labor supply. If one is looking for a uniﬁed
56theory of labor supply at the individual and aggregate level then one clearly wants
to be able to address life cycle observations in these models.
In the next two subsections we consider models which have addressed these
issues.
4.1. Chang and Kim (2006)
We begin by considering the paper by Chang and Kim (2006). This paper consid-
ers an aggregate model in which individuals are subject to idiosyncratic shocks,
face incomplete markets for credit and insurance, and in which all labor supply
adjustment occurs at the extensive margin. Additionally, it considers households



















where  is household consumption,  is hours worked by the male household
member and  is hours worked by the female household member. As noted, it
is assumed that individuals can only supply 0 or ˆ  units of labor in any period.
In steady state the wage per eﬃciency unit of labor services will be constant and
denoted by , but individual productivity will be stochastic. If  denotes labor
productivity for a worker in period  then he or she will have labor earnings equal
to ¯  if working. The labor productivity of each member is assumed to follow
a stochastic process:
log+1 =  log + +1,  =  (4.1)
57where the innovations are assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and
standard deviation . Innovations are iid across time and across individuals.
The production side of the economy is standard, with a Cobb Douglas aggre-
gate production function that uses capital and labor services. Capital depreciates
at the constant rate  and output can be used as either investment or consumption.
The market structure is as follows. In each period there are competitive mar-
kets for capital and labor services as well as output. Individuals are allowed to
have negative holdings of capital (i.e., be in debt) but capital holdings cannot go
below ¯ . There are no markets for insurance against idiosyncratic shocks, but as
in Aiyagari (1994) and Huggett (1993), individuals can accumulate capital to self
insure. Note that there are no markets for employment lotteries in this economy.
Chang and Kim focus on the steady state equilibrium of a calibrated version
of their model. Table 2 in their paper provides information on all of the calibrated
parameter values. Here we focus on a few key details. First, the period length
is chosen to be one quarter. The stochastic processes for both male and female
idiosyncratic shocks are quite persistent ( = 948,  = 925)a n dq u i t ev a r i a b l e
( = 269,  = 319). The constants  are calibrated so as to match the em-
ployment to population ratios for both males and females. Total time endowment
is normalized to one and ˆ  is set to 13.
Chang and Kim present various statistics on the distribution of earnings and
wealth to argue that their model does a reasonable job of capturing the amount
of heterogeneity in the data along these dimensions.38 Because all households are
38As is well known, the model cannot capture the extreme concentration of wealth in the
upper one percent of the wealth distribution.
58the same except for the realizations of the idiosyncratic shocks, the steady state
distribution of households across outcomes is also the same as the time series av-
erages for a given household. Since the model is calibrated to match the economy
wide employment to population ratios for both males and females, it follows that
each individual will only spend a fraction of their life in employment. Over time,
individuals will move between spells of employment and nonemployment. While
Chang and Kim do not address the issue of whether this model produces empiri-
cally reasonable patterns for these transitions, recent work by Krusell et al (2010,
2011) argues in a slightly more general version of this model that this is the case.
Chang and Kim then use the steady state equilibrium of their calibrated econ-
omy as a laboratory to consider the properties of individual and aggregate labor
supply. The ﬁr s te x e r c i s et h a tt h e yc a r r yo u ti st h ef o l l o w i n g . T h e yc o n s i d e ra
sample of 50000 households in the steady state, simulate their histories for 120
quarters and then aggregate the observations to annual frequencies. In the spirit of
Altonji (1986) they run a panel regression of the following form using individuals
who have positive hours in each year:
log = (log − log)+ (4.2)
They do this separately for both men and women. For their benchmark calibration
they obtain estimates of  equal to 41 and 78 for males and females respectively.
The key ﬁnding here is that if one runs standard labor supply regressions on
individual data generated by the model, one will obtain relatively small estimates
of the labor supply elasticity parameter for men, and a larger estimate for women.
59They then consider the aggregate labor supply elasticity in their model. To
assess this they carry out the following experiment in the spirit of Kydland and
Prescott (1982). They assume that the economy is subject to an AR(1) aggregate
technology shock, simulate the economy for 30000 quarters, compute aggregates
and run the regression in equation (4.2) using aggregate time series data. The
resulting estimate for  is now 108. In a second exercise they consider a stand-in












where  is now allowed to take on any value in the interval [01].T h e yc o n s i d e r
various values of ˜  and in each case recalibrate the model so as to match the
same aggregate targets. Assuming the same process for aggregate technology
shocks they compute standard business cycle moments for both this economy and
the previous economy. The business cycle statistics from the stand-in household
model are most similar to those from the heterogeneous agent economy when ˜ 
is set equal to 2.F r o mt h ep e r s p e c t i v eo ft h i se x e r c i s ew es e et h a ti fo n ew a n t e d
to use a stand-in household model to mimic the business cycle statistics for the
heterogeneous agent economy, one would have to adopt a value of ˜  that is roughly
ﬁve times as large as the estimate based on individual data for male workers. The
presence of empirically reasonable heterogeneity in this model does indeed have a
dramatic eﬀect on the implied aggregate elasticity, lowering it from inﬁnity down
to around 2. Nonetheless, the key point is that the value of 2 is still large.
60Related work has examined the extent to which this framework inﬂuences
how aggregate hours work react to a simple tax and transfer program like the
one studied in Section 2. Alonso-Ortiz and Rogerson (2010) use a single agent
household version of the Chang and Kim model and ﬁnd that the response in
aggregate hours is large, in fact, somewhat larger than what one ﬁnds for a stand-in
household model with a Frisch elasticity of 2. Ljungqvist and Sargent (2006, 2008)
consider a model in which individuals have ﬁnite lives, are subject to a stochastic
learning-by-doing technology, and face a discrete labor supply choice. While they
do not use their model to assess elasticity estimates from micro data, they do ﬁnd
that the response of aggregate hours in their model is similar to what is found
in models that abstract from human capital accumulation altogether. However,
the model with human capital accumulation has very diﬀerent predictions for the
identities of which individuals choose not to work as the tax and transfer program
is expanded.
In subsequent work, Chang and Kim (2007) use a version of their model de-
scribed above that assumes single agent households in order to study additional
properties of business cycles. While not of direct relevance to the issues that we
focus on, it is interesting to note that their model addresses some earlier short-
comings of the stand-in household model commonly used in aggregate analyses.
Speciﬁcally, as noted by many authors, beginning with Mankiw et al (1985), the
aggregate data are not consistent with the static ﬁrst order condition implied
by consumer optimization. That is, observed values for hours, consumption and
wages (or alternatively labor productivity) are not consistent with the marginal
61rate of substitution being equated to the real wage rate or labor productivity. The
subsequent literature has labelled the discrepancy in this ﬁrst-order condition as
the “labor wedge”.39 Chang and Kim (2007) show that in their model with ag-
gregate technology shocks, if one tries to interpret the resulting aggregate data
using a stand-in household model, one will generate substantial movements in the
labor wedge over the business cycle. An et al (2009) further show that this model
can reconcile the types of results found in Mankiw et al (1985).
To summarize, the key ﬁnding from Chang and Kim (2006) is that in the
steady state of their model, the Frisch labor supply elasticity estimated from
micro data is not the same as the one estimated from aggregate data. Moreover,
there is no connection between the elasticity from micro data and the preference
parameter , since by construction the value of  is irrelevant in their model.
The contribution of this work is to establish that the earlier results of Hansen
(1985) and Rogerson (1988) continue to be quantitatively relevant in a setting
that features empirically relevant sources of heterogeneity and a plausible market
structure, thereby providing a better bridge between analyses of individual and
aggregate labor supply.
One limitation of the Chang and Kim analysis is that it precludes adjustment
along the intensive margin. In their regressions involving micro data, all of the
variation in their measure of the intensive margin (i.e., annual hours worked)
comes from extensive margin adjustment during the year. In the data we know
39See for example, the papers by Parkin (1988), Bencivenga (1992), Hall (1997), Gali, Gertler
and Lopez-Salido (2002), Mulligan (2002), Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2004) and Cole and
Ohanian (2004) who note this property in various contexts.
62that there is some “true” adjustment along the intensive margin. In the next
subsection we discuss models that allow for a continuous choice of hours along
the intensive margin. Chang et al (2011) consider a model that lies in between
these two alternatives. Speciﬁcally, they assume that workers must choose among
three work options: no work, part-time work, or full-time work. In this model,
there is adjustment along the intensive margin, i.e., workers moving between full-
time and part-time work, but this adjustment is discrete. Chang et al (2011)
ﬁnd that standard labor supply regressions do not uncover the true value of 
in this environment, even when focusing on the choice of intensive margin for
continuously employed workers. Additionally, the value of  seems not to matter
for aggregate responses in total hours.40
4.2. Rogerson and Wallenius (2009)
We now turn to a second class of models that considers the relation between
individual and aggregate labor supply elasticities in environments that feature an
extensive margin at the individual level. Unlike the previous models in which
all adjustment occurred at the extensive margin, this class of models will allow
for adjustment along both margins. We focus on the analysis in Rogerson and
Wallenius (2009), which is in turn a generalization of the model in Prescott et
al (2009). This model can also be viewed as embedding a simpliﬁed version of
40Another case of interest is when the choice of hours along the intensive margin features
an element of coordination. In this case, individuals may not be free to adjust hours along
the intensive margin in response to idiosyncratic shocks, whereas we might observe adjustment
along the intensive margin in response to aggregate changes in the economic environment. See
Chetty et al (2011a) and Rogerson (2011) for further discussion of this issue.
63French (2005) into a general equilibrium setting.
4.3. Model
This model of life cycle labor supply emphasizes two key dimensions of lifetime
labor supply: the fraction of life that an individual devotes to employment and the
fraction of time devoted to market work in those periods in which the individual
is employed. It is convenient to formulate the problem in continuous time to
make the choice of what fraction of life to spend in employment a continuous one.
Consider an individual with length of life normalized to one who has preferences
deﬁned by: Z 1
0
[(() − (())]
where () is consumption at age , () i st i m ed e v o t e dt om a r k e tw o r ka ta g e,
(·) gives the utility ﬂow from consumption and (·) gives the disutility ﬂow from
working. Note that the individual does not discount future utility ﬂows in this
speciﬁcation. Although we will not present the analytics of the model here, this
serves to simplify the analytic characterization of the solution to the individual’s
maximization problem. The steady state interest rate is assumed to equal zero,
so that these two factors will be oﬀsetting as is standard in many macroeconomic
models with inﬁnitely lived agents.
To generate variation along the intensive margin when working, the produc-
tivity of an individual’s time is assumed to vary systematically over the life cycle
and is denoted by ().41 The wage rate per unit of labor services is assumed
41We note an interesting issue that arises with a speciﬁcation in which this productivity
64to be constant over time and equal to . The individual faces complete markets
for borrowing and lending and as noted above the interest rate on borrowing and
lending is set equal to zero. In a “standard” model the present value budget







T h ek e yi n n o v a t i o no ft h i sm o d e li st of o l l o wP r e s c o t te ta l( 2 0 0 9 )b ya d d i n g
an o n c o n v e x i t yt ot h em a p p i n gf r o mt i m ed e v o t e dt ow o r kt ot h er e s u l t i n gl a b o r
services. In particular, when a worker of age  devotes  units of time to market
work, the resulting supply of labor services is given by ()() where for ease of
exposition () is assumed to take the form:
()=m a x { − ¯ 0}
The key property of this speciﬁcation is that the relation between total labor
earnings and hours devoted to market work is convex. More generally, one could
process is exogenous and credit markets are complete. In the data, wages are not symmetric
over the life cycle, in the sense that wages at the end of the life cycle are much higher than
wages at the beginning of the life cycle. If wages are exogenous and markets for borrowing and
lending are perfect, this creates a problem for a model that includes an endogenous retirement
decision. The reason for this is that there is an incentive for individuals to avoid working in the
early part of life in order to avoid the low wages during this period, and to instead work more
at the later part of the life cycle when wages are higher. Wallenius (2009) develops a version
of the model studied here that features endogenous human capital accumulation as in Imai and
Keane (2004) and shows how it can match the life cycle proﬁle for both wages and hours. To
maintain tractability, rather than include a human capital accumulation decision, here we follow
Rogerson and Wallenius (2009) and abstract from trying to match the actual proﬁle of wages
o v e rt h el i f ec y c l e .
65consider speciﬁcations in which the marginal wage is a function of the length of
the workweek.42 If ¯  =0then the individual labor supply problem is completely
standard, but cannot generate “retirement” as an endogenous outcome, in the
sense of a worker who has labor supply that switches from full time work to no






max{() − ¯ 0}() (4.3)
The above discussion has thus far only described a single agent decision prob-
lem. Rogerson and Wallenius consider this single agent problem in the context of
a steady state equilibrium of an overlapping generations model. At the risk of triv-
ializing the general equilibrium considerations, but with the gain of transparency,
assume a small open economy in which the real interest rate is exogenously ﬁxed
at zero, and an aggregate production function that is linear in labor services with
marginal product normalized to one.44 If the price of output is normalized to one,
the equilibrium wage rate  per eﬃciency unit of labor must also equal unity. As-
suming a new generation of identical individuals with total mass equal to one is
born at each instant, in steady state a new-born household will maximize lifetime
42French (2005) considers both speciﬁcations in his empirical work. Speciﬁcally, he assumes
that labor earnings as a function of hours devoted to market work are given by ( − ¯ )1+,
where 0. For the issues that we discuss here it does not matter whether one focuses on
the case ¯ 0,  =0or ¯  =0 , 0,o r¯ 0, 0. The key point is that nonconvexities
introduced either via ¯  or  can lead to discontinuities in labor supply and the endogenous
creation of an operative extensive margin.
43More precisely, if ¯  =0the model cannot generate discontinuous adjustment along the hours
worked margin in response to continuous changes in the underlying economic environment.
44The small open economy assumption is not essential. In this model one can always specify
ag o v e r n m e n td e b tp o l i c yt h a tw i l ls u p p o r tas t e a dy state equilibrium with a zero interest rate.
66utility subject to the present value budget equation (4.3).
Rogerson and Wallenius use this model to assess the quantitative consequences
of the simple tax and transfer scheme introduced in Section 2. That is, consider
a proportional tax on labor earnings that is used to ﬁnance a uniform lump-sum






and that life cycle productivity () is piecewise linear.
Given these functional forms, the key issue that Rogerson and Wallenius in-
v e s t i g a t ei sh o wt h ep a r a m e t e r matters for properties of the life cycle proﬁle and
how this proﬁle responds to changes in the scale of the tax and transfer policy. For
each of several values of  they choose values for the model’s other parameters
so as to match three targets: fraction of life spent in employment, peak hours
worked over the life cycle and wage changes over the lifecycle. Some care needs
to be taken in matching up wages in the model with wages in the data. In the
model, the wage per unit of labor services, which was denoted by ,i se q u a lt o
unity at all points in time. But wages in the data are measured as labor earnings
per hour of work, and because of the nonconvexities in the () function, wages
per unit of time, denoted by , are not equal to unity.45 At a xr a t eo nl a b o r
earnings of 3 is assumed when calibrating the model, which corresponds to the
average eﬀective tax on labor income in the US in recent years. Having calibrated
the model, Rogerson and Wallenius then examine what happens to equilibrium
hours if the tax rate is increased to 5, which corresponds to the average eﬀective
45If the ﬁxed time cost ¯  were intepreted as a commuting cost then this eﬀect would not
be present. While this intepretation is not relevant for the main results reported below, the
assumption that ¯  represents time at work does have interesting implications for the connection
between standard labor supply regressions and the underlying preference parameter .
67tax on labor income in several economies in continental Europe in recent years.46
4.3.1. Micro Elasticities On the Intensive Margin
Before reporting the eﬀects of the change in tax and transfer policies, it is of
interest to examine some features of individual labor supply in the calibrated
benchmark economies. Given a value of  and the calibration procedure just
described, the model will generate a life cycle proﬁle for hours worked, (),a n d
hourly wages, (). Rogerson and Wallenius generate a panel life cycle data set
for hourly wages and hours worked by choosing 67 equally spaced values during the
period of life in which hours are positive, running from 0 to 66 and evaluating the
two functions () and () at these points. Note that all of the data points in
the sample are times at which individuals are employed. They run the regression:
log(()) = 0 +˜  log(
()) + () (4.4)
The resulting parameter estimate ˜  is the micro labor supply elasticity for indi-
viduals in the model, viewed through the lens of the standard model described in
Section 2.
Table 3 shows the estimated values of ˜  for the benchmark calibrated model
f o rf o u rd i ﬀerent values of  : 151 and 2.
46Several authors have produced estimates of eﬀective tax rates for various countries, including
Mendoza et al (1994), Prescott (2004) and McDaniel (2006). While there are small diﬀerences in
methodology across studies, the 20% diﬀerences between the US and countries such as Belgium,
France, Germany and Italy is a robust ﬁnding.
68Table 3
Estimated Micro Elasticities
 =2  =1  = 5  = 10
129 59 28 05
The table shows that lower values of  are associated with lower estimated
elasticities. Interestingly, however, the estimated value of ˜  is only about half as
large as the true underlying value of . The reason for this discrepancy is the
nonlinearity of the earnings function in hours. In particular, the nonlinearity of
 implies that higher hours worked imply higher hourly wage rates, so that the
wage () moves more over the life cycle than does the underlying exogenous
productivity proﬁle (). If one were to run the micro labor supply regression
using the exogenous productivities () instead of the wage proﬁle () then the
regression coeﬃcient would be much closer to the true value of .
4.3.2. Aggregate Elasticities
For each of the four diﬀerent calibrated economies (one for each of the four values
for  in Table 3), Rogerson and Wallenius consider what happens to the steady
state hours proﬁle if the tax rate on labor income is increased from 3 to 5,
assuming that the proceeds continue to fund a uniform lump-sum transfer to all
individuals subject to a balanced budget constraint at each point in time. With
the given functional forms, one can show that such a tax causes a proportional
shift in the hours proﬁle, conditional on being employed. It follows that one can
summarize the shift in the hours proﬁle by simply reporting the shift in peak
69hours worked, which we denote by . For each economy Rogerson and Wallenius
compute the values of aggregate hours (), fraction of life spent in employment
(), and peak hours worked over the life cycle (), all relative to the values in
the benchmark calibrated economy with  = 3. Table 4 reports their results.
Table 4
Relative Outcomes for  = 5
  
200 777 857 856
100 784 825 918
050 788 808 956
010 790 794 991
Several features are worth noting. First, the implied change in aggregate hours
worked is large in all four cases—more than 20%. Second, despite the dramatic
diﬀerences in estimated micro labor supply elasticities in the four economies—
af a c t o r25 diﬀerence between the highest and lowest—the changes in aggregate
hours worked are essentially constant across the four diﬀerent economies. Third,
although the value of  has virtually no eﬀect on the change in aggregate hours
worked, it has very signiﬁcant eﬀects on how the change in aggregate hours is
broken down into changes in working life versus changes in hours worked while
employed. In analyzing this decomposition, note that the relative change in 
is a measure of the change in total hours due to changes in the  proﬁle holding
 constant, since as noted earlier, the hours proﬁle shifts proportionately, and for
ag i v e n, a proportionate shift in the proﬁle shifts aggregate hours by the same
70amount. However, it is not true that a shift in  leads to a proportionate shift in
aggregate hours, since as  decreases the marginal employment episodes that are
lost represent fewer hours of work. In any case, when  =2 00 the downward shift
in the hours proﬁle accounts for over 60% of the total decrease in hours, while
when  = 10 this downward shift accounts for less than 5% of the shift.
The above results indicate that in this life cycle economy with operative inten-
sive and extensive margins, micro labor supply elasticities estimated from workers
with positive hours are not particularly relevant in predicting the aggregate eﬀects
of permanent changes in taxes. The key feature of the economy that is responsi-
ble for this is the nonconvex mapping from time spent working to labor services,
which in turn gives rise to the operative extensive margin in terms of life cycle
labor supply. To understand this, consider an economy that is identical to the one
described above except that the function () is now assumed to be the identity
function, i.e., that ¯  =0 . Figure 2 illustrates how this will inﬂuence the ﬁndings.
In this ﬁgure, the top line shows a stylized life cycle productivity proﬁle. The
two solid lines indicate the life cycle proﬁle for hours worked in the case of ¯  =0
and ¯ 0. As the picture shows, if ¯ 0 then the model can generate outcomes
in which hours worked are concentrated in the period of life in which productivity
is highest. In particular, hours worked are not continuous in productivity. In
contrast, if ¯  =0 , it is optimal for the individual to smooth hours worked across
time, although hours of work will be higher when productivity is higher. But in
this case hours vary continuously with productivity. The two dashed lines indicate
the eﬀects of higher taxes on hours of work in the two cases. If ¯ 0, then the
71hours worked proﬁle shifts down and the reservation productivity level shifts up,
so that individuals spend a lower fraction of their life in employment.47 In the
case of ¯  =0 ,t h eo n l ye ﬀect is a downward shift in the hours proﬁle. In both
cases the extent of the downward shift of the hours proﬁle is very strongly related
to the micro labor supply elasticity. Because this downward shift is the only eﬀect
when ¯  =0 , it turns out that there is a strong relationship between micro and
macro elasticities in this case, as shown in Section 2.
However, the issue is more severe than simply being that the micro elasticity
only captures one piece of the aggregate adjustment in hours in the case when ¯ 
0. The results in Table 4 show that the smaller is the part that the micro elasticity
captures, the larger is the part that it does not capture, i.e., the lower the value of
, the larger is the response on the extensive margin. The important message to
take away from this is that adjustment along the intensive and extensive margins
are not independent of each other; changes in parameters that inﬂuence the extent
of adjustment along the intensive margin will necessarily change the extent of
adjustment along the extensive margin as well.48
47Here we did not present any analytic results. Rogerson and Wallenius (2007) shows analyt-
ically that an increase in the scale of the tax and transfer system leads to a reduction in lifetime
labor supply along both the intensive and extensive margin.
48An important clariﬁcation should be noted here. Conceptually, there is no fundamental
connection between an individual’s willingness to substitute work along the intensive marginover
the life cycle and their willingness to subsitute work along the extensive margin over the life
cycle. In particular, one can choose parameters for preferences and technology such that both
elasticities are small. The results in Rogerson and Wallenius reﬂe c tt h a tf a c tt h a tt h e yi m p o s e
a particular set of functional forms and some additional moment restrictions. Speciﬁcally, as
they change the value of  they also change other parameters of the model so as to continue to
match a given set of moments.
72Rogerson and Wallenius go on to ask what a researcher might infer if they
used the benchmark model from Section 2 to interpret steady state diﬀerences
in aggregate hours worked across two economies that were identical except for
diﬀerent scales of the tax and transfer systems. The answer is that they could
i n f e rt h a tt h ev a l u eo f is more than an order of magnitude larger than the true
underlying value of . The reason is that whereas in the model the key role that
 plays is to determine the response along the intensive margin, the response in
aggregate hours also includes a possibly large response on the extensive margin.49
If one tries to infer  from aggregate data, the implied value of  must proxy for
adjustment along both margins.50
Rogerson and Wallenius (2009) carry out their analysis in a very stylized econ-
omy. Subsequent work has examined richer versions of this framework. While
the results described above come from a very simple aggregate model, Walle-
nius (2009) has analyzed similar issues in a more standard aggregate framework.
Speciﬁcally, she studies a discrete time overlapping generations version of the
standard neoclassical growth model that also allows for endogenous human cap-
ital accumulation as in Imai and Keane (2004). The above conclusions continue
49Kitao et al (2009) and Ljungqvist and Sargent (2010) have argued that the model of Rogerson
and Wallenius contains too much responsiveness on the retirement margin and argue that one
should adopt a speciﬁcation in which individuals are not at an interior solution with respect to
retirement.
50Wallenius (2011) provides another context in which this issue arises. She considers a simpler
version of Imai-Keane which features ﬁxed costs and therefore an endogenous retirement decision.
She uses this framework to infer preference parameters consistent with the average life cycle
proﬁles for wages and hours along the intensive margin. Although she obtains a substantially
smaller value of  than Imai and Keane, her model gives similar responses in aggregate hours
worked due to the fact that there is an extensive margin an addition to the intensive margin.
Loosely speaking, in Imai and Keane the estimated value of  is capturing the response along
both margins.
73to hold in this more elaborate framework. She also considers a much richer set
of policies, that include modeling speciﬁc details of how social security programs
vary across countries.
Erosa et al (2011) extend the Rogerson and Wallenius model along many
dimensions in order to better match a wide variety of features of male labor
supply over the life cycle. For example, their analysis allows for multiple sources
of heterogeneity (both idiosyncratic shocks as in Chang and Kim (2006), as well as
ﬁxed eﬀects), explicitly considers time aggregation eﬀects, has a serious treatment
of measurement error in wages, and considers diﬀerent sources of nonconvexities.
While the properties of their model are broadly consistent with those in Rogerson
and Wallenius, they ﬁnd that the details that they introduce are important
determinants of aggregate labor supply responses.51
4.4. Summary
The key conclusion from this section is that in models that feature adjustment
a l o n gt h ee x t e n s i v em a r g i n ,t h ep r e f e r e n c ep a r a m e t e r need no longer play a
key role in determining the response of aggregate hours of work to changes in
the economic environment. In the model of Chang and Kim, all adjustment
occurs along the extensive margin, and the value of the parameter  is completely
irrelevant in determining the responsiveness of aggregate hours. In the analysis of
51One result of interest relates to their simulation of the the tax holiday that occured in
Iceland in the late 1980s. In their model the response along the extensive margin in response to
this type of temporary tax change matches what was observed in Iceland during their one year
tax holiday. This is in contrast to what was found in Chetty et al (2011b) based on a simulation
of the much simpler model of Rogerson and Wallenius (2009).
74Rogerson and Wallenius, the value of the parameter  is important in inﬂuencing
how the change in aggregate hours is broken up into changes along the intensive
and extensive margins, but to ﬁrst order is irrelevant in determining the response
of total hours to changes in the scale of a simple tax and transfer program.
5. Adjustment Along the Extensive Margin: Evidence from
Micro Data
The previous section suggests that an important source of reconciliation regarding
small estimates of  from micro data vis-a-vis the relatively large assumed aggre-
gate labor supply elasticities in many macro models is that the seminal papers
from the micro labor supply literature focus almost exclusively on adjustment
along the intensive margin. If a large part of the aggregate adjustment occurs
along the extensive margin, then there need not be any conﬂict. But this suggests
that a key empirical issue is to assess the responsiveness of labor supply along the
extensive margin in micro data. In this section we survey the relatively young
literature that treats this issue in the context of structural models.52
It is important to note an important issue with this objective relative to the
52A recent paper by Chetty et al (2011b) surveys the literature on quasi-experimental evi-
dence on the elasticity of the extensive margin response in diﬀerent settings and compares those
estimates with the implications of a parameterized version of the model in Rogerson and Wal-
lenius (2009). Interestingly, they ﬁnd that responses to permanent changes are similar whereas
responses to transitory changes are much larger in the Rogerson-Wallenius model than in the
quasi-experimental studies. Understanding the source of this discrepancy is an important topic
for future work in this area. We already noted that the more elaborate model of Erosa et al
(2011) does reconcile the observed responses in Iceland. We note that these exercises do not
allow for human capital accumulation, and as pointed our earlier, this can have ﬁrst order eﬀects
for how hours respond to tax changes.
75previous literature that estimated the responsiveness along the intensive margin.
In the simple benchmark model introduced in Section 2, the responsiveness along
the intensive margin was intimately related to the preference parameter ,t h e r e b y
creating a very focused objective for researchers who wanted to estimate the de-
terminants of labor supply responses from micro data using structural methods.
Of course, in more elaborate models such as those that we discussed in Section
3, the relationship is more complicated, although it remains true that the pref-
erence parameter  remains important. In contrast, even in very simple models,
responsiveness along the extensive margin is not captured by a single preference
parameter. Whether a given individual responds along the extensive margin will
depend upon how close they are to some threshold that determines the point
at which it becomes optimal to switch discretely from working to not working.
The aggregate response is thereby intimately related to the determinants of these
thresholds and the distribution of individuals around these thresholds.
This creates a much more diﬀuse objective for empirical researchers who want
to use micro data to structurally estimate the responsiveness of a given popu-
lation of individuals along the extensive margin. For example, there are many
potential sources of heterogeneity and relatively little is known about how diﬀer-
ent sources of heterogeneity might matter. In the previous section it was common
to assume heterogeneity in market wage rates, but one could also, for example,
have heterogeneity in the ﬁxed costs associated with market work. The results
of Rogerson and Wallenius discussed previously also suggest that one cannot in
general disentangle the estimation of responses along the intensive margin from
76the estimation of responses along the extensive margin.53 It follows that all of the
issues discussed previously about obtaining accurate estimates of the preference
parameter  are still relevant in the context of estimating responses along the
extensive margin.
5.1. Early Work on Structural Models of Participation
All of the extensions to the basic life cycle model that we discussed in Section
3 continue to generate interior solutions for optimal hours, so wage changes only
aﬀect labor supply on the intensive margin. In order to study labor supply of
women, for whom non-participation in the labor force is prevalent, Heckman and
MaCurdy (1980, 1982) stayed within the MaCurdy (1981) framework, but adopted









Unlike the speciﬁcation that we have used previously, this speciﬁcation gen-
erates a reservation wage. The reason for this is that with this speciﬁcation the
marginal disutility of work is not zero at full leisure. The oﬀer wage must exceed
this value in order for an agent to choose to work. But this model maintains an
53The reverse is also true. Wallenius (2011) argues that incorporating an extensive margin
to capture endogenous retirement into a model that features human capital accumulation as in
Imai and Keane (2004) can have important implications for the value of  that is consistent with
the standard life cycle proﬁle for hours worked. However, this need not have any implications
for the overall responsiveness of labor supply. In response to a permanent change in labor taxes
used to fund a lump-sum transfer, a lower value of  does imply less response on the intensive
margin, but the response along the extensive margin due to the endogenous retirement margin
can largely oﬀset this eﬀect.
77important feature of the MaCurdy (1981) framework: (notional) optimal hours
are a continuous function of the oﬀer wage. This means that, for wages slightly
above the reservation wage, a worker will choose to work a small number of hours.
An implication of this model is that given a continuous distribution for un-
derlying primitives, it predicts a continuous distribution for hours worked, and
in particular that one should observe women who work a very small number of
hours. Instead, the hours distribution is bimodal, with some people not working
at all, while those who do generally work a fairly large number of hours (e.g., 25
to 45 per week). It is precisely this observation that motivated Cogan (1981) to
consider a departure from the standard text-book model of labor supply. It is
exactly this observation that motivated the speciﬁcations of Rogerson (1988) and
Hansen (1985) that we studied previously.
To generate this pattern, Cogan introduced ﬁxed costs of work into a static
labor supply model. He showed that, given ﬁxed costs, the model generates not
only a reservation wage, but also “reservation hours.” That is, when the oﬀer wage
passes the reservation wage, optimal wage hours jump from zero to a substantial
positive value.
To be speciﬁc, consider the simple quasi-linear utility function:
()= + 





Letting  denote the wage rate,  be non-labor income and  be the ﬁxed (mon-
78etary) costs of working, utility as a function of hours worked can be written as:
()=( +  − )+






Optimal hours conditional on working are then:






In the absence of ﬁxed costs the reservation wage would be simply:





−  0, i.e., if ¯ 
− 1
 (5.3)
However, as Cogan (1981) points out, it is not appropriate to use marginal
conditions to determine the participation decision rule in the presence of ﬁxed
costs. Instead, we must compare the utilities conditional on working and not
working. The decision rule for working is (∗) (0), which can be expressed
as:




















−1]=  0 (5.4)
It is instructive to compare (5.3), which simply says a person begins to work when
desired hours are positive (i.e., ¯  − (
)−  0 ), with (5.4), which says a person
will begin to work only when optimal hours exceed the reservation hours level .
If ﬁxed costs are substantial, then reservation hours may be substantial, and we
will not observe people working a small number of hours.54
54It is notable that both costs of working ()a n dt a s t e sf o rw o r k( ) enter the participation
79Cogan (1981) went on to show that ignoring ﬁx e dc o s t sc o u l dl e a dt o
severe bias in estimates of female labor supply functions. To explain why, we
need to take a slight detour to discuss estimation of labor supply functions in
the presence of non-participation. Given non-participation, a person’s market
wage rate is typically not observed. But the classic paper by Heckman (1974a)
developed a method for estimating labor supply functions when wages are only
observed for workers. In his framework, the labor supply equation is estimated
jointly with a wage equation by maximum likelihood. The unobserved wages of
the non-participants are treated as latent variables, and they are integrated out
of the likelihood. To estimate labor supply behavior in the presence of ﬁxed costs,
Cogan (1981) proposed extending the Heckman (1974a) approach to estimate a
three equation system, consisting of a labor supply function, an oﬀer wage function
and a reservation hours function as captured by equation (5.4).
Cogan (1981) applied his approach to data on married women aged 30 to
34 taken from the 1967 National Longitudinal Survey of Mature Women. In this
sample, 898 wives worked and 939 did not. The labor supply and reservation hours
functions both include the wife’s education and age, number of young children,
and husband’s earnings. Cogan estimated that ﬁxed costs are substantial (about
28% of average annual earnings), and that a young child raises ﬁxed costs by
about a third. Cogan’s labor supply function implies a Marshallian elasticity of
089 at the mean of the data, and a Hicks elasticity of 093.
equation, while only  enters the labor supply equation. Hence, it is possible that a variable
like young children could aﬀect ﬁxed costs of working but not tastes for work. Then, it would
aﬀect the participation decision but not labor supply conditional on participating.
80However, Cogan also shows that these elasticities are rather meaningless in this
context. As he notes, a 10% increase in the oﬀer wage to the average non-working
woman in the sample would not induce her to enter the labor market. But a 15%
increase would induce her to jump to over 1327 hours. However, an additional
15% wage increase would “only” induce a further increase of 180 hours (or 136%).
[Note: this is still a rather large increase, consistent with a Marshallian elasticity
of 13615 = 090].
It should be noted that any generalization of the standard labor supply model
which dispenses with a linear budget constraint will break the close link between
preference parameters and labor supply elasticities (or responses) that characterize
that model.55 Aside from ﬁxed costs, other leading examples of departures from
linearity are welfare beneﬁts (which play a role symmetric with ﬁxed costs if grants
are paid to unemployed workers), progressive taxation, and the tax-transfer system
more generally.
Indeed, the literature on tax-transfer program eﬀects on labor supply, which
had to deal with the problem of the non-linear budget constraints that such pro-
grams create, recognized early on that, in this context, utility function parame-
ters were no longer tightly linked with any particular elasticity concept (see, e.g.,
Blomquist (1983), Burtless and Hausman (1978), Hausman (1980, 1985), and
Moﬃtt (1983).56 Thus, labor supply could appear to be “elastic” or “inelastic,”
55We noted one instance of this in the previous section where the presence of a non-linear
budget equation in Rogerson and Wallenius (2009) implied a substantial discrepancy between
the coeﬃcient on log wages in a standard labor supply regression and the preference parameter
.
56For instance, as noted by Hausman (1980), “Structural econometric models which make
labor force participation a function of ... wages, income transfer levels and the tax system can
81depending on the type of budget constraint shift one considered.57
To illustrate, Figure 3 presents a budget constraint that is similar to the old
AFDC program in the US for single mothers. It incorporates (i) a ﬁxed welfare
grant  that is taxed away at a 100% rate with earned income, and (ii) a ﬁxed
cost of working . The resulting constraint goes through points  and .
This non-convex constraint is in contrast to the linear wage line through the  =0
point. The indiﬀerence curve is drawn in such a way that utility is maximized at
point ,w h e r e =0 .
The ﬁgure illustrates the eﬀect of a drop in the program tax rate from 100%
to 50%. This shifts the budget line from the solid line  to the dotted line .
Notice that this substantial increase in after-tax wages induces no labor supply
response — the person continues to locate at zero hours. Nevertheless, we can see
that a small additional tax cut would cause the person to jump to full-time work.
This is similar to the pattern found by Cogan (1981) when he used his model to
attempt to answer questions such as the eﬀect of lowering the marginal tax rates on labor force
particpation. The more traditional reduced form models which do not explicitly parameterize
the tax system will be unable to answer such questions.” Or, as noted by Blomquist (1983), “A
change in the gross wage rate, nonlabor income, or parameters of the tax system changes the
whole form of the budget set ... the elastcities presented above should therefore not be used to
calculate [their] eﬀects...”
57A particularly striking example is Blomquist and Hansson-Busewitz (1990), who model labor
supply of 602 married men (aged 25-55) in Sweden, using data from the 1980 Level of Living
Survey. They model these men as making optimal hours choices subject to the progressive tax
structure (in a static framework). Using their utility function estimates, they plot both the
"structural" labor supply equation that would obtain if people maximized utility subject to a
linear budget constraint, and the "reduced form" equation that gives desired hours as a function
of wages and the existing tax structure. Strikingly, while the “structural” labor supply curve
has a positive Marshallian elasticity throughout, the reduced form supply curve is backward
bending for wage rates above 26 SEK per hour. This compares to an average after-tax rate of
14.83 SEK. Thus, an analysis that fails to account for progressive taxation could easily conclude
labor supply is backward bending beyond a certain point, when this is only a feature induced
by the tax system, not by underlying preferences.
82simulate responses to wage changes.
An even more interesting point is that a small increase in the wage rate would
cause the person in Figure 3 to jump from 0 to 40 hours of work per week (by
slightly raising point )e v e na tt h ei n i t i a l100% tax rate. Thus, a large eﬀect of a
small wage increase is consistent with a scenario where substantial reductions in
the tax rate (e.g., from 100% to 50%)h a v en oe ﬀect whatsoever. The implication
is that, with a non-linear budget constraint, wage increases and tax reductions of
t h es a m em a g n i t u d em a yh a v ev e r yd i ﬀerent eﬀects.
Given a budget constraint like that in Figure 3, a researcher given histori-
cal data that contained variation in tax rates over the 100% to 50% range, who
estimates what Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) call a “prototype empirical speciﬁ-
cation” (see their equation 430), might well conclude that labor supply of program
participants is highly inelastic. Historically this is roughly what happened: years
of tinkering with the AFDC tax rate in attempts to create work incentives had
little eﬀect, leading to a conventional wisdom that labor supply was “inelastic”
for single mothers. Thus, many observers were taken completely by surprise when
a change in policy in the mid-1990s, toward wage subsidies (EITC) and child care
subsidies (CCDF), as well as a strong macroeconomy that raised wage rates, led
in a short period of time to dramatic labor supply increases for this group.
Notably, however, Keane and Moﬃtt (1998) and Keane (1995), had modelled
labor supply behavior of single mothers taking into account the full complexity of
t h eA F D Cb u d g e tc o n s t r a i n t( a sw e l la st h eF o o d s t a m pp r o g r a ma n dﬁxed costs of
work). Simulations of their model implied that AFDC tax rate reductions would
83have little eﬀect, but that labor supply of single mothers would be quite sensitive
to wage subsidies, EITC and ﬁxed cost of work subsidies (or work bonuses).
5.2. Life-Cycle Models with a Participation Margin
We now turn to the topic of introducing ﬁxed costs of work and the extensive mar-
gin into dynamic life-cycle models. Kimmel and Kniesner (1998) appear to have
been the ﬁrst to extend the basic MaCurdy (1981) and Heckman and MaCurdy
(1980, 1982) framework to include ﬁxed costs, though they did not structurally
estimate the model’s primitives. Speciﬁcally, they estimate a life-cycle labor sup-
ply equation analogous to (2.11) jointly with a participation decision rule and an
oﬀer wage function. We can write the system as:
log =  +  log +  +  (5.5)
(  0) = ( +˜  log + ) (5.6)
Here (5.5) is a Frisch labor supply function where the ﬁxed eﬀect  cap-
tures the marginal utility of wealth (consumption), along with any ﬁxed eﬀects in
tastes for work. Equation (5.6) gives the probability of participation and  is a
cumulative distribution function (which Kimmel and Kniesner (1998) assume to
be normal, giving a probit model for participation). The ﬁxed eﬀect  in the
probit model captures not just the marginal utility of wealth and tastes for work,
but also individual heterogeneity in the ﬁxed costs of work.
84In this framework  is the conventional Frisch elasticity of labor supply con-
ditional on employment (i.e., the elasticity on the intensive margin). But we now
introduce a Frisch participation elasticity given by:
 =






Kimmel and Kniesner (1998) estimate this model using data on 2428 women from
the Survey of Income Program Participation (SIPP), 68% of them married. The
data were collected from May 1983 to April 1986, giving 9 periods of data.
The estimates imply a Frisch intensive margin elasticity of 066 for em-
ployed women, and a Frisch participation elasticity of 239. Let average hours in
t h ep o p u l a t i o nb eg i v e nb y = ˆ  where ˆ  is average hours of the employed and









= 66 + 239 = 305 (5.8)
Kimmel and Kniesner (1998) also obtain results for men, and ﬁnd  =0 39 and
 =0 86 so that  +  =1 25.
Thus, the results suggest that: (i) the participation elasticity is much larger
than the hours elasticity for both women and men, and (ii) the overall elasticity is
quite a bit larger for women than men. These results strongly suggest that failure
to account for participation decisions may lead one to substantially underestimate
the overall responsiveness of labor supply to wage changes. This is supportive of
the mechanics in the model of Rogerson and Wallenius (2009) discussed in the
85previous section.
There is a strong conventional wisdom in the economics profession that labor
supply elasticities are greater for women than for men. Granting that this is cor-
rect, an interesting question is whether it arises because (a) the extensive margin
is more relevant for women (i.e., because they have a lower participation rate)
or (b) because of a host of other potential explanations, involving diﬀerences in
preferences and/or constraints that women face.
Interestingly, studies that estimate labor supply elasticities for employed women
typically ﬁnd low elasticities similar to those found for men. Consider two of the
best known papers: Blundell and Walker (1986) estimated a life-cycle model of
labor supply for employed married women. They obtained an (average) Frisch
elasticity of only 0033, a Hicks elasticity of only 0009, and a Marshallian elas-
ticity of −0197 (at the mean of the data). More recently, Blundell, Duncan and
Meghir (1998) estimated a life-cycle labor supply model for employed married
women using data from UK Family Expenditure Survey 1978 to 1992. UK tax
rates were reduced substantially over the period, and the basic idea of the paper
was to exploit this variation to help identify labor supply elasticities. Their es-
timates of the compensated and uncompensated wage elasticities at the mean of
the data were a modest 020 and 017, respectively. Thus, it appears that using
m e t h o d st h a ta c c o u n tf o rt h ep a r t i c i p a t i o nd e c i s i o na r ei m p o r t a n ti nﬁnding large
labor supplies elasticities for women.
We next turn to the literature that has structurally estimated life-cycle models
that include the participation decision. It is worth noting that the approach
86to estimating life cycle models developed by MaCurdy (1981), as well as the
extensions to accommodate the extensive margin implemented by Heckman and
MaCurdy (1980, 1982) and Kimmel and Kniesner (1998), avoid having to fully
solve agents’ dynamic optimization problem by dealing exclusively with (i) the
ﬁrst order condition for an interior solution for hours and (ii) a reservation wage
condition that can be derived from the ﬁrst order condition — i.e., whether the
wage exceeds the MRS evaluated at zero hours. But life-cycle models that include
the participation decision along with other mechanisms that extend the basic life-
cycle model (e.g., human capital, credit constraints) cannot be handled so simply.
Estimation of such rich models requires a full-solution structural approach.
This structural approach requires (i) solving the dynamic optimization faced
by agents and (ii) ﬁnding parameter values for preferences such that the model
g e n e r a t e sb e h a v i o rt h a ti sb ys o m em e t r i cs i m i l a rt ot h eb e h a v i o ro b s e r v e di nt h e
data. For reviews of this literature, see, e.g., Keane and Wolpin (2009) and Rust
(1996).
The ﬁrst paper to adopt a full solution approach to modelling female labor
supply was Eckstein and Wolpin (1989). Their model included work decisions on
the extensive margin and human capital accumulation through work experience.
Indeed, only the extensive margin is operative in the model (agents must choose to
work either full-time or not at all), and they estimated it using married women in
the NLS Mature Women’s cohort. Subsequently, the female labor supply literature
has extended Eckstein and Wolpin (1989) to include other important life-cycle
decisions. Van der Klaauw (1996) extends Eckstein-Wolpin to make marriage a
87choice, while Francesconi (2002) makes fertility a choice. All three of these papers
ﬁnd that labor supply is highly responsive for women on the extensive margin,
with uncompensated elasticities with respect to permanent wage changes in the 3
to 5 range.58
The most comprehensive modelling eﬀort to date is Keane and Wolpin (2007,
2010). They extend earlier work to include a part-time work option. And mar-
riage, fertility, school attendance and welfare participation are all included as
choices.59 The model is estimated using data from the NLSY79 cohort (women
aged 14 to 21 in 1979 who attain a maximum age of 33 by 1991). In experiments
where they permanently increase the oﬀer wage by 5%, Keane and Wolpin (2010)
ﬁnd a wage elasticity of roughly 28.
It is important to note, however, that the elasticities generated by these dy-
namic structural models are rather diﬀerent from ones we are used to seeing re-
ported in the more conventional labor supply literature. That is, aside from labor
supply, they also allow (depending on the study) some combination of experience,
fertility, marriage and education to adjust to wage changes. Thus, they measure
“long run” or cumulative responses.
For instance, say a tax cut causes a woman to work more in the current period.
This means not only that she will have more human capital in the next period,
but also that her expected number of children is reduced. Both the human capital
58The focus of these papers is not on labor supply elasticities per se, so they do not report
elasticities directly. The ﬁgures in the text are our own calculations based on simulations
reported in the papers. See Keane (2010) for more details.
59It is not feasible to solve such a complex model analytically. Thus, Keane and Wolpin utilize
approximate solution methods developed in Keane and Wolpin (1994).
88and fertility eﬀects further enhance labor supply in the next period, and so on.
This is identical to the “snowball” eﬀect of a permanent wage or tax change that
we referred to when discussing the Imai and Keane (2004) model for men. But for
women additional sources of dynamics, like fertility, are likely to be important.
This means that conventional labor supply studies that treat fertility as given are
likely to understate long run responses to permanent wage/tax changes.
Finally, Keane and Wolpin (2010) also ﬁnd that wage elasticities are inversely
proportional to skill, with the highest skilled women having an elasticity of only
06, while lowest skilled have an elasticity of 92. These diﬀerences are indicative of
the importance of the extensive margin. The high skilled women have a very high
participation rate in the baseline, so there is little scope for them to adjust. In
contrast, for the low skilled women, only about a third are working in the baseline
simulation, and this increases to roughly 50% with wage increase. Clearly, a large
segment of the low skilled women are close to indiﬀerent between working and not
working, and a small wage increase can shift a large number across the margin.
This is consistent with our earlier discussion of labor supply eﬀects of welfare
programs, which are very relevant for the low skilled group.
There are many fewer papers in the male labor supply literature that con-
sider the extensive margin (an exception being the Kimmel and Kniesner paper
discussed earlier). This is because it has generally been viewed as a less important
factor for men, because of their high participation rate. However, research sug-
gests that the extensive margin is much more important for young males, males
near retirement, and minority groups. For instance, as we noted earlier, French
89(2005) ﬁnds high labor supply elasticities for older men, and attributes this to the
extensive margin becoming more important as they approach retirement and the
participation rate falls.
In addition, Keane and Wolpin (1997, 2000, 2001) wrote a series of papers
on the career decisions of young men. Their models allow for work decisions
(on the extensive margin), along with schooling and occupation choices, all of
which inﬂuence the evolution of human capital. Unfortunately, as they focus on
education/occupation choices, they did not simulate the labor supply responses
implied by their models. The best we can do to assess this is to look at Keane
and Wolpin (2000), which estimated the same model of career choice on both
blacks and whites in the US. The only parameters allowed to diﬀer between the
two groups were the initial distribution of skill types at age 16, and the rental
price of skill (which presumably captures labor market discrimination).60 Keane
and Wolpin (2000) report a simulation where they increase the rental price of skill
for blacks up to the same level as whites. This implies roughly a 6% increase in
the wage rate.61 At age 30 it causes the percent of blacks who are employed to
increase from 838% to 907%,a n82% increase. Thus, the implied elasticity with
respect to a permanent (uncompensated) wage increase for black males at age 30
is roughly 826=1 4.
60Keane and Wolpin (2000) could not reject the hypothesis that other parameters (e.g., tastes
for work) were the same for blacks and whites. They argued that the diﬀerences in skill distrib-
utions between the two races at age 16 was likely due to diﬀerences in human capital investment
at younger ages (e.g., the quality of childcare, pre-school and primary schools, the home envi-
ronment, etc.).
61Actually, to achieve equality the rental price was increased by 8% in the white collar occu-
pation and 5% in the blue collar occupation. As roughly twice as many of the employed blacks
were in blue collar, the average rental price increase is roughly 6%.
90It is also of interest to revisit Chetty’s (2010) analysis of the implications of
optimization frictions in the context of estimating labor supply responses along
the extensive margin. Our earlier analysis of this issue assumed that workers are
always at an interior solution, and so implicitly is only applicable to choice along
the intensive margin. Chetty (2010) goes on to argue that adjustment costs would
not lead one to understate labor supply elasticities on the extensive (participation)
margin. Consider extending (3.7) to include ﬁxed costs of work (), non-labor
income ( ) and welfare and/or unemployment beneﬁts () for those who do not
work:







 −  · [  0] +  · [ =0 ] (5.9)
Now consider a person who is indiﬀerent between participating and not partici-
pating in the labor force. Letting ∗













 −  =  (5.10)
Now, consider a reduction in the tax rate, leading to an increase in (1 − ).
The person’s utility says ﬁxed if he/she remains at +1 =0 . However, if he/she
begins to work, the utility gain can again be decomposed into two parts: (i)
the gain from beginning to work, but holding hours ﬁxed at the old optimum of
+1 = ∗
, and (ii) the gain from adjusting hours to the new optimum implied by
91the lower tax rate. The gain in utility, and consumption, from beginning to work
is simply ∗
∆(1 − ).T h i s g a i n i s a ﬁr s to r d e rf u n c t i o no ft h ec h a n g ei nt h e
tax rate. As a fraction of +1earnings/consumption (given that +1 = ∗
), it is
simply equal to the percentage change in the tax rate.
Thus, Chetty argues, adjustments costs (as a percentage of earnings) would
need to be as large as the percentage change in the tax rate for people near the
participation margin not to adjust to a tax cut by starting to work. This in
turn, means existing estimates of elasticities on the extensive margin (that ignore
adjustment costs) are not likely to be seriously biased.
There is one qualiﬁcation regarding this result. Chetty’s analysis does not
consider welfare/unemployment beneﬁts  or non-labor income  (he assumes
consumption in the non-working state is zero). Given the existence of non-work
beneﬁts, the consumption gain from beginning to work (at hours level +1 = ∗
),
expressed as a fraction of time  consumption, is ∗
∆(1 − )( + ).E v e n
though this gain is ﬁrst order in taxes, it can be arbitrarily small, depending on
how large  and  are (or how small  is). Implicitly, Chetty is allowing the indi-
vidual to make suboptimal choices that are small when measured by consumption
loss as a percent of potential labor earnings. But it may be more natural to ask
if the consumption loss is small as a percent of total consumption (i.e., potential
labor earnings plus non-labor income).
Whether this issue matters depends on the empirical relevance of the situ-
ation in which an individual has consumption that is substantially larger than
(potential) labor earnings. For most individuals this is probably not the case.
92To the extent that labor earnings are the dominant source of income for most
individuals, even a hand-to-mouth consumer would have consumption no larger
than labor earnings. For the truly wealthy, say those in the top 1% of the wealth
distribution, non-labor income may be larger relative to labor income and as a
results consumption may be large relative to labor income. But these individuals
are presumably of little relevance for estimating participation rate elasticities in
most studies.
There are, however, two cases of possible interest where consumption may be
relatively large compared to potential labor earnings. The ﬁrst is the situation
of multi-member households where the second earner has a much lower wage
rate than the primary earner. In evaluating the labor supply decision of the
second earner it is possible that the bias due to adjustment frictions might become
relevant. The second case is that of a single mother who is eligible for beneﬁts that
are large relative to potential labor earnings. If the beneﬁts are only received in
the event that the individual does not work, then the issue is not relevant, in the
sense that for such an individual there is no incentive to work and hence the labor
supply decision is not really relevant. But, if the individual is eligible for such
things as food stamps, housing subsidies and/or medicaid even when working,
then it is certainly possible that consumption is much larger than labor earnings.
Hence, it is possible that biases associated with optimization frictions continue to
be relevant for low income single mothers.
935.3. Summary
The literature on estimating extensive margin elasticities in dynamic structural
models is relatively young. However, based on the existing studies, there appears
to be a very consistent pattern of high estimated labor supply elasticities for
women at the extensive margin, as well as for males who have relatively low
participation rates (i.e., the young, the old and minorities).
6. Conclusion
Based on the last major survey of the micro labor supply literature by Blun-
dell and MaCurdy (1999), it is fair to say that the consensus view among labor
economists was (and still is) that labor supply elasticities are small. In contrast,
macroeconomists generally work with equilibrium models in which Hicks (or com-
pensated) and Frisch (or inter-temporal) labor supply elasticities are quite large
(i.e., in the range of 1 to 2). In this survey we have described a relatively new
literature — which, with a few notable exceptions, has emerged since Blundell and
MaCurdy (1999) — that seeks to reconcile these conﬂicting micro and macro views
on labor supply.
This literature can be viewed as consisting of two branches. The ﬁrst
branch focuses on the micro perspective. In the basic life-cycle labor supply
model (i.e., MaCurdy (1981)) the only source of dynamics is borrowing/saving.
A number of authors have considered extensions of this model to include other
potentially importance sources of dynamics, such as human capital accumulation,
borrowing constraints, precautionary saving (given future wage uncertainty), de-
94cisions on the extensive margin and/or labor supply adjustment costs. This work
has shown that if the true model (or data generating process) contains such mech-
anisms, but the data is viewed through the lens of the basic model, then estimates
of labor supply elasticities will tend to seriously understate their true values.
The second branch focuses on the macro perspective. This literature
emphasizes issues associated with aggregation in the presence of the extensive
margin and worker heterogeneity. This literature has shown that small (intensive
margin) elasticities at the individual level can be consistent with large elasticities
at the aggregate level. In some cases, the value of the preference parameter ,
which was the focus of much of the early literature, is virtually irrelevant for the
response of aggregate hours to speciﬁc changes in the economic environment.
Both of these literatures share one key point in common, however. In
the basic life cycle model of MaCurdy (1981) there is a direct link between pa-
rameters of individual level preferences and the Hicks and Frisch elasticities at
the aggregate level. All the extensions to the basic model that we have described
break that direct link. This is not to say that individual preference parameters no
longer matter. But, in general, labor supply elasticities are not only a function of
preference parameters but also of all other aspects of the economic environment as
well: This includes the wage process, the functioning of credit markets, the tech-
nology of job search/hours adjustment, the production technology (in particular
how productivity varies with hours), and so on.
In this complicated world, estimation of individual preferences alone is not
adequate to model labor supply. Predicting the eﬀects of changes in wages and/or
95taxes and transfers will, in general, require structural modelling of the complete
economic environment. Given the diﬃculty of such exercises, it may be tempting
to resort to an “experimental” approach of just cataloguing responses to observed
tax changes. But in our view this would be misguided. As we have shown, even
in simple models, changes in after-tax wages can have very diﬀerent eﬀects on
labor supply, depending on the source of the change and/or slight diﬀerences in
its magnitude. Thus, it is very diﬃcult to generalize from historical episodes to
predict how people would respond to a new policy change. The failure of most of
the profession to predict the consequences of the U.S. welfare reform of the mid
9 0 si sa ne x c e l l e n te x a m p l eo ft h i sp r o b l e m . A ne v e nm o r eb a s i cp o i n ti st h a t ,
even if we could predict labor supply responses to hypothetical changes in public
policy simply by extrapolation from historical episodes, we cannot evaluate the
w e l f a r ec o n s e q u e n c e so fp o l i c i e sw i t h o u tam o d e lo ft h ee c o n o m i cs t r u c t u r e .
In our view, the literature we have described can credibly support a view
that compensated and inter-temporal elasticities at the macro level fall in the
range of 1 to 2 that is typically assumed in macro general equilibrium models.
Indeed, the problem that confronts us now is that the reconciliation is, in a sense,
too easy. That is, we have described multiple mechanisms that can achieve the
desired reconciliation. Of these, which are actually the most relevant? In our view,
answering this question will require building models with multiple mechanisms,
and seeing how well they explain multiple aspects of behavior — not just labor
supply, but also schooling, occupational choice, savings, etc.. (The work by Keane
and Wolpin (2001, 2010) is an example of this type of strategy). Obviously this
96is a large (and daunting) program for future research. But it is important to
realize that simply being able to reconcile aggregate labor supply responses with
observations from micro data is not in itself suﬃcient. As we have described,
the speciﬁc mechanism(s) used to achieve the reconciliation will lead to diﬀerent
implications regarding welfare eﬀects of policies, even if those policies generate
similar labor supply responses.
Finally, we oﬀer some conjectures on how such an ambitious research
program might proceed. As we have seen, models with human capital and/or
the extensive margin can generate large labor supply elasticities. In our view it
would be hard to argue that work experience does not augment wages, or that the
production technology along with ﬁxed costs of work does not constrain workers’
choices of working hours. The empirical evidence that experience augments wages
and that workers rarely choose to work a small number of hours is quite convincing.
Thus, we strongly suspect that human capital and the extensive margin will be
key components of future labor supply models.
On the other hand, the importance of other mechanisms we have discussed —
i.e., liquidity constraints, precautionary saving, ﬁxed costs of adjusting hours —
seems more speculative. As we discussed, the evidence on liquidity constraints and
the strength of the precautionary motive is controversial. This is largely because
both these mechanisms lead to behavior that looks similar, as well as being similar
to the behavior generated by other mechanisms like complementarity between
hours and consumption, age varying tastes, etc.. And the obvious problem with
the costs of adjustment mechanism is that — unlike say, the extent to which wages
97rise with work experience — it is hard to know what plausible values for costs of
adjustment are.
This is not to say we dismiss the importance of these other mechanisms.
Rather, our point is that they are relatively subtle (i.e., hard to identify), and
we strongly suspect it will not be possible to credibly pin down their importance
using data on wages and labor supply alone. This brings us back to the program
we advocated earlier of building models with multiple mechanisms, and seeing how
well they explain multiple aspects of behavior. While models with human capital
and/or the extensive margin can generate large labor supply elasticities, we may
need mechanisms like liquidity constraints or adjustments costs to explain more
subtle aspects of savings/consumption behavior, occupational choice, fertility, etc.
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113Figure 1: Hours, Wages and Price of Time over the Life-Cycle 
 
 
Note: HC denotes the return to an hour of work experience, in terms of increased present value of future 
wages. The opportunity cost of time is Wage + HC. 
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Note: The wage line drawn through the zero hours point is not the relevant budget constraint, due 
to the AFDC grant (G), the fixed cost of working (FC) and the AFDC tax on earnings, which render the 
actual constraint non-convex. The actual budget constraint goes through a, b, c, d, e. The dotted line 
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